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Abbreviations and explanations 
Abbreviations 
ABARE  Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
CES  constant elasticity of substitution 
CGE  computable general equilibrium 
COAG  Council of Australian Governments 
GDP  gross domestic product 
GRP  gross regional product 
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GMW Goulburn-Murray  Water 
MDB Murray-Darling  Basin 
MDBC  Murray-Darling Basin Commission  
MI Murray  Irrigation 
MIA Murrumbidgee  Irrigation  Area 
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MMRF  Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting model 
VMP  value of the marginal product of water 
Explanations 
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•  Markets for trading irrigation water enable water to be re-allocated to more 
productive uses — with gains to buyers and sellers. Water trade can also lessen the 
impact of reductions in irrigation water availability. 
–  If markets for seasonal water allocations continue to develop, further productivity 
gains may be made even if trades in water entitlements remain constrained. 
•  A general equilibrium model provides preliminary analysis of the long run regional 
and industry impacts of reductions of 10, 20 and 30 per cent in water availability in 
the base year in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), under conditions of no 
trade, intra-regional trade only, and both intra- and interregional trade.  
•  The model estimates that moving from no trade to intra- and interregional trade 
together more than halves the impact of the reductions in water on the gross regional 
product (GRP) of the southern MDB. 
– Moving from no trade to intra-regional trade lessens the impact by 35 to 
42 per cent. Including interregional trade reduces it another 22 to 24 per cent. 
•  For a 10 per cent reduction, the model estimates: 
–  without water trade, GRP declines by around 1 per cent ($356 million in 2003) 
–  with intra-regional trade only, GRP declines by around 0.7 per cent 
–  with intra- and interregional trade, GRP declines by around 0.5 per cent 
–  with interregional trade, the Murrumbidgee and Murray regions in New South Wales 
become net exporters of water, while the northern Victorian regions and the Murray 
Lands region in South Australia become net importers. 
•  A 20 per cent reduction in water availability has more than double the effect on GRP 
of a 10 per cent cut, while a 30 per cent cut has an almost fourfold effect. The 
relative effects of expanding trade in all cases is similar. 
•  The ten per cent reduction in irrigation water leads to an output decline in most 
industries. However, in most industries, declines in output are lower when intra- and 
interregional trades are allowed. In the southern MDB: 
–  dairy industry output falls by 8 per cent under intra-regional trade, and by 4 per cent 
under intra- and interregional trade  
–  perennial horticulture industry output decreases by 1.4 per cent under intra-regional 
trade, and by 0.7 per cent under intra- and interregional trade 
–  rice industry output falls by 15 per cent under intra-regional trade and by 20 per cent 
under intra- and interregional trade 
–  for each industry, there can be significant differences in effects across regions. 
•  In years with low water availability, water reductions would have a larger effect on 
GRP than if the cut had occurred in years with higher water availability. 
•  Short run analysis of the expansion of trade under variable seasonal allocations 
shows similar effects. 
•  This analysis does not take into account the impact of changes in water trade on 
environmental conditions such as salinity.         
  INTRODUCTION  1
 
1 Introduction 
On 25 June 2004, the Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) agreed to a 
National Water Initiative covering a range of areas in national water management. 
This initiative seeks, among other things, to expand water trade to bring about 
‘more profitable use of water and more cost effective and flexible recovery of water 
to achieve environmental outcomes’ (COAG 2004). This paper examines the likely 
economic impacts of expanding water trade in the southern Murray-Darling Basin. 
Water trade in Australia involves trade in both water entitlements and seasonal 
water allocations: 
•  Trade in water entitlements (sometimes referred to as ‘permanent trade’) 
involves transferring the ongoing right to access water for the term of the right.  
•  Trade in seasonal water allocations (sometimes called ‘temporary trade’) 
involves transferring some or all of the water allocated to the entitlement for the 
current irrigation season or an agreed number of seasons.  
In the three major irrigation districts of the southern Murray-Darling Basin (the 
Murray Irrigation district, the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, and the Goulburn-
Murray Water district), gross trade in entitlements accounted for less than 2 per cent 
of total water allocations in 2002–03, while gross trade in seasonal allocations 
accounted for around 20 per cent (appendix A, table A.4). 
In addition to seasonal conditions and allocations, a variety of factors affect trade 
within and between irrigation districts. Some are physical capacity constraints — 
for example, limitations on the volume of water able to pass through the ‘Barmah 
Choke’. Others are regulatory in nature — for example, Victoria’s regulation that 
entitlements to, and allocations of, irrigation water can be transferred only between 
those who own land that can be irrigated. Also in Victoria, water authorities may 
refuse trades that would result in more than 2 per cent of the total water entitlement 
being transferred from an irrigation district per year. Administrative restrictions on 
interregional trade are also imposed by private irrigation authorities — for example, 
in New South Wales there are constraints on net trade out of districts. 
With trade, water can shift to uses where it yields higher marginal returns (net of 
transfer costs). Revenue from water sales can supplement farm income and provide     




finance for other on-farm or off-farm activities, or facilitate exit from an industry. 
Water trade can also lessen the impact of reductions in irrigation water availability.  
Of interest are the magnitude and distribution of the effects of expanding water 
trade at the national and state levels, as well as the impact on industries and regions 
as irrigation activities adjust. Using a general equilibrium model of the Australian 
economy, the long run effects of trade given 10 per cent, 20 per cent and 30 per cent 
reductions in the amount of water available to irrigators in the southern Murray-
Darling Basin and short run reductions based on observed allocations for 1997-98 to 
2001-02 are examined to gain insights into these questions. This study compares the 
effect of these reductions in water in three experiments: first, assuming no trade in 
water; second, assuming only intra-regional trades; and, third, assuming both intra- 
and interregional trades. The model is concerned only with costs reflected in market 
prices for goods and services, and therefore does not account for ‘externalities’. 
The next chapter provides an overview of irrigated agriculture, water markets and 
constraints to water trade in the southern Murray-Darling Basin. Chapter 3 presents 
the model and data used in the analysis, and outlines the simulations and sensitivity 
analysis. Chapter 4 presents and discusses results of long run simulations and 
identifies the key assumptions and limitations of the analysis. Chapter 5 discusses 
the results of short run simulations.     




2  Water trade and irrigation in the 
southern Murray-Darling Basin 
Irrigation water represents around 70 per cent of all water used in Australia (ABS 
data, appendix A, table A.1). The ‘livestock, pasture, grains and other agriculture’ 
industries, which include dairy farms, account for around 57 per cent of irrigation 
water use (table A.1). Horticulture, which includes vegetable growing, fruit growing 
and grape vine growing, accounts for around 13 per cent, while cotton and rice 
account for 12 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. In the southern Murray-
Darling Basin (MDB), the rice, dairy and horticultural industries are the largest 
users of irrigation water, accounting for 32 per cent, 21 per cent and 16 per cent 
respectively (TERM database, appendix D, table D.2). 
Irrigation water is used to supplement rainfall on farms. In most cases, rainfall in 
the regions in which irrigation districts are located is insufficient on its own to 
sustain current farming practices. In an average season, a rice crop in southern New 
South Wales, for example, needs 13 megalitres of irrigation water per hectare (the 
equivalent of 1300 millimetres of rainfall) in addition to average rainfall during the 
growing season (NSW Agriculture 2003). By comparison, the average annual 
rainfall in this region is about 400–450 millimetres per year.  
Irrigation water sources and irrigation districts 
Irrigators can source irrigation water from: 
•  on-farm storage and diversion of surface water flows across farms 
•  on-farm pumping and diversion of groundwater 
•  diversions of water from on-farm water courses 
•  major storage, diversion and delivery infrastructure managed by public and 
private utilities — sometimes referred to as supplemented irrigation schemes. 
The last is the main form of irrigation water supply in Australia and the focus of this 
study.      




Irrigation districts are concentrated in the eastern states of New South Wales, 
Victoria and Queensland and draw water from Great Dividing Range catchments 
(appendix A, figure A.1). Over 70 per cent of irrigation use occurs within the MDB, 
with most supplemented irrigation located within the southern MDB (figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1  Major Irrigation Districts in the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
 
Data source: Murray-Darling Basin Commission.     




Most irrigated farms in the southern MDB are grouped within discrete irrigation 
districts located adjacent to the Murrumbidgee, Murray, Goulburn and other rivers. 
Diversions of water from rivers supplying these districts represent around 70 per 
cent of all diversions in the MDB (MDBC 2003a, p. 7). 
Major irrigation districts include the Murray Irrigation (MI), Murrumbidgee 
Irrigation Area (MIA) and Coleambally Irrigation districts in southern New South 
Wales, and the Goulburn-Murray Water (GMW) district in northern Victoria. These 
districts account for around 90 per cent of water entitlements in the southern MDB 
(appendix A, table A.3). Several smaller irrigation districts located along the River 
Murray between Swan Hill in Victoria and Murray Bridge in South Australia 
encompass the ‘Sunraysia’ and ‘Riverland’ districts.  
Water entitlements and seasonal allocations 
In the southern MDB, irrigators hold entitlements that define access rights to a 
specific quantity of water each irrigation season. The supply reliability of these 
entitlements varies between jurisdictions and depends upon storage capacity and the 
volume of entitlements distributed — for example: 
•  In Victoria and South Australia, entitlements are specified in perpetuity and are 
likely to be fully met around 96 and 99 years in 100 respectively 
(MDBC 2003b).  
•  In New South Wales, entitlements are for 15 years, being either high security 
(with similar reliability to the Victorian and South Australian entitlements) or 
general security (likely to be met around 75 years in 100 and only after high 
security entitlements have been met) (MDBC 2003b). The New South Wales 
government recently announced such entitlements will be made perpetual 
(Knowles 2004). Around 90 per cent of New South Wales entitlements (in the 
southern MDB) are general security.  
Within an irrigation season, each entitlement holder can (for a charge — see below) 
access a percentage of their entitlement — this is called a ‘seasonal allocation’. 
Irrigation utilities determine this percentage according to the availability of water 
supplies from storages. Entitlement holders can call on allocations (in full or part) 
for delivery at any stage during an irrigation season. In each year, the total volume 
of water made available by utilities is shared among water entitlement holders 
according to their priority and entitlement to the resource. In Victoria, if a seasonal 
allocation is not used, it cannot be carried over and used in the following season. In 
contrast, in New South Wales, irrigators can carry over part of the unused seasonal 
allocations to use in the following season.      




In some years, in some jurisdictions, utilities offer seasonal allocations to irrigators 
in excess of, but proportional to, their entitlement. This practice is most common in 
Victoria where these extra allocations are known as ‘sales water’. (In New South 
Wales the term is ‘supplementary water’ — previously ‘off allocation water’). 
Victoria has utility rules that constrain the trade in sales water (see below). 
Reflecting seasonal conditions and the distribution of general security allocations in 
New South Wales, seasonal allocations as a percentage of entitlement between 
1996–97 and 2002–03 were generally lower in the MI district than in the MIA 
(table 2.1). In contrast, this percentage was highest on average in the GMW district. 
Utility charges 
Utilities charge irrigators for services to meet entitlements and deliver water to 
farms. These charges are designed primarily to recover the operational, maintenance 
and some capital costs associated with supply activities, including harvesting, 
storage, diversions and delivery. In most districts, utilities charge irrigators a two-
part tariff comprising a fixed and variable component. 
•  The fixed component is based on the irrigator’s water entitlement volume. Some 
water utilities announce this charge at the beginning of the irrigation season 
based on anticipated costs and deliveries (for example, the GMW district), while 
others calculate it at the end of the season based on actual costs and deliveries 
(for example, the MI district). 
•  The variable component is based on the volume of water either allocated or 
delivered during the irrigation season. 
Examples of utility charges in the southern MDB are provided in table 2.2. The 
charges are significantly higher in districts in which delivery requires pumping 
(such as Sunraysia) than those with gravity feeding. 
Table 2.1 provides details of irrigation water allocated for the major New South 
Wales and Victorian irrigation districts from 1996–97 to 2002–03. Data for the 
GMW district and the MIA are based on volumes allocated — actual consumption 
varies from these volumes because of trade between districts, and the seasonal 
carryover of water in the MIA. In contrast, data for the MI district are based on 
usage (including trade and carryover). The 2002–03 data for the MI district 
illustrate the importance of trade and carryover in altering water use patterns. In that 
year, seasonal allocations were just 8 per cent of entitlement, but water usage was 
over 30 per cent of average use.       




Table 2.1  Seasonal water allocations and usagea 
 MIA  GMW districtb MI  districtc
   
High security 




   
Murray 
 
   
Volume of allocations (GL) 
Volume of 
usage (GL)
242  987  1 543  1 020  1 472
249  878  1 225  839  1 046
251  825  1 041  945  1 168
283d  725 949 740  675
269  837  1 071  923  1 295
269  669  1 109  1 024  1 240








Average  262  753  1 085  905  1 034
  Percentage of entitlements allocated (%) 
100  100  100+100 sales  100+100 sales  93
100  90  100+20 sales  100+30 sales  68
100  85  100+0 sales  100+100 sales  77
100 78  100+0  sales  100+30  sales  29
95  90  100+0 sales  100+100 sales  78
95  72  100+0 sales  100+100 sales  86








Average  98  79  100+11 sales  100+70 sales  63
a The total water entitlement for each district may change from year to year as a result of permanent trade 
between districts. b Allocations do not include diversions. c Aggregate of high and general security, because 
high security entitlements and allocations are small. d Increase reflects conversion of general security 
entitlements to high security entitlements.  
Sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 April 2004; MIA, pers. comm., 7 and 27 April 2004; Murray 
Irrigation Limited (2003). 
When an entitlement holder decides to trade some or all of their seasonal water 
allocation, the buyer is responsible for the variable charge for the delivery of the 
water to the buyer’s farm, while the seller is responsible for meeting any fixed 
charges associated with the seasonal allocation. In the case of water entitlement 
trades, the buyer of water becomes the new entitlement holder and is thus 
responsible for all fixed and variable charges. This arrangement has raised concerns 
about ‘stranded assets’ — that is, if water is permanently traded out of an irrigation 
district, utility costs are spread across smaller water volumes and fewer irrigators 
(resulting in higher charges for remaining irrigators). For further discussion of the 
stranded asset issue, see Goesch (2001) and Gordon, Kemp and Mues (2000).     




Table 2.2  Examples of utility charges, 2000–01a 
Utility Fixed  Variable
  $/ML of entitlement  $/ML delivered
Murray Irrigation Limitedb,c   5.65  8.18
Goulburn-Murray Water (Greater Goulburn subdistrict)  21.48  8.30
Sunraysia Rural Water Authority (Robinvale subdistrict)  52.45  47.15
Central Irrigation Trust (Medium pressure)  14.32  40.10 
a Excludes drainage and miscellaneous charges and non-volume related charges. b  For flood irrigation 
districts only, excluding drainage and Land and Water Management Plan charges. c  Excludes the utility 
operational cost recovered from shareholders at the end of the irrigation season. 
Sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 April 2004; MI, pers. comm., 16 April 2004; Sunraysia Rural 
Water Authority, pers. comm., 31 March 2004; Central Irrigation Trust, pers. comm., 1 April 2004. 
Quantities of water traded  
Currently, irrigators trade primarily with other irrigators in their irrigation district, 
and trade is predominantly in seasonal water allocations. Markets for trade in 
seasonal allocations are well established within major irrigation districts, such as the 
MIA and the MI and GMW districts, with electronic exchanges and brokers 
facilitating trade. In 2000–01 to 2002–03, aggregate trade in seasonal allocations 
represented, on average across the three districts, 11–20 per cent of allocations 
(appendix A, table A.4) — trade volumes vary considerably from year to year and 
across districts depending on seasonal conditions and allocations. In contrast, trade 
in entitlements usually represents a much smaller share of annual total allocations 
— on average, 1–2 per cent across the three major districts between 2000–01 and 
2002–03 (appendix A, table A.4).  
Of interest in this study is the net trade (exports minus imports) of seasonal 
allocations and entitlements to and from irrigation districts. This is because the total 
water available for use within a district in a year represents the seasonal allocations 
(including carryovers) and the combined net trades in seasonal allocations and 
entitlements to the district within the year. The volume of entitlements at the start of 
the year includes all net trade in entitlements from previous years.  
The volume of net trade in seasonal allocations is relatively small and can vary 
across irrigation districts from year to year (see, for example, table 2.3; appendix A, 
table A.4). In most years, South Australia is a net seller of seasonal allocations to 
New South Wales and Victoria (6100  megalitres exported in 2000–01). The 
direction of net trade between New South Wales and Victoria differs across years, 
but New South Wales is usually a net buyer of seasonal allocations from Victoria 
(reflecting the lower reliability of allocations in New South Wales).      




Table 2.3  Net New South Wales trade in seasonal allocationsa 
 2000–01  2001–02  2002–03
 ML  ML  ML
Murrayb   (20 842)  20 729  (35 726) 
Murrumbidgee   26 597  (31 487)  14 152 
Victoria  (2 792)  1 657  15 581 
South Australia  (2 963)  9 101  5 993 
a Figures in parentheses denote net imports. b Incorporates irrigators on the lower Darling River from the 
Menindee Lakes to Wentworth.  
Data source: State Water South, pers. comm., 1 April 2004. 
Net trade in entitlements is relatively minor and fluctuates from year to year 
(table  2.4). Irrigators in South Australia have consistently purchased water 
entitlements, while Victorian irrigators and, to a lesser extent, New South Wales 
irrigators have been sellers.  
Table 2.4  Net trade in water entitlements, by statea 
 1998–99  1999–00  2000–01  2001–02  2002–03  Total
 ML  ML  ML  ML  ML  ML
New South Wales  2 747  3 016  176  (222)  (274)  5 443
Victoria  351  2 214  3 099  2797  503  8 964
South Australia  (3 098)  (5 230)  (3 275)  (2575)  (229)  (14 407)
a Figures in parentheses denote imports. 
Source: MDBC, pers. comm., 26 February 2004. 
Water trade prices 
Prices paid for traded seasonal water allocations display significant spatial and 
temporal variation, illustrating that the markets for water can differ from district to 
district, from year to year and, within a year, from week to week (figure  2.2). 
Between 2000–01 and 2002–03, for example, seasonal allocation prices were 
generally higher in the GMW district, followed by the MI district and then the MIA. 
In 2000–01, the average weighted price for traded seasonal allocations was $33 per 
megalitre, $16 per megalitre, and $18 per megalitre in the three districts 
respectively.      




Figure 2.2  Average weekly prices per megalitre for seasonal allocations in 
























a  Average weekly pooled price per megalitre; MIA price for 2000-01 is a yearly average. b GMW data for the 
Greater Goulburn subdistrict. c MIA data for 2001-02 were not available.  
Data sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 December 2003; MI, pers. comm., 22 December 2003; 
MIA, pers. comm., 2 February 2004. 
Prices for traded seasonal allocations rose significantly during the recent drought 
and traded well above utility charges. In 2002–03, the average weighted price for 
seasonal allocations was $364 per megalitre in the GMW district, $210 per 
megalitre in the MI district and $114 per megalitre in the MIA. However, during 
flood periods or after harvests, for example, the opposite situation can arise, and 
utility charges may exceed the marginal value and traded price of water.  
The price of water entitlements is significantly higher than the price for seasonal 
allocations because entitlements buy a stream of future allocations as well as the 
current allocation. Prices for water entitlements differ across irrigation districts, 
partly as a result of the differing rights attached to the entitlements. The price of 
water entitlements from the GMW district, for example, is substantially higher than 
that in the MI district, reflecting in part the lower reliability of general security 
water in New South Wales (figure 2.3).     




Figure 2.3  Average monthly prices for trade in water entitlements, 
















Data sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 April 2004; Murray Irrigation Limited (2004). 
Constraints on water trading 
Constraints to water trading in the southern MDB can reflect: 
•  hydrological and environmental considerations 
•  economic or ‘market-based’ factors 
•  administrative and regulatory arrangements. 
In some cases, constraints are interconnected — for example, regulatory 
arrangements developed to reflect hydrological impediments. This chapter provides 
a brief background description of some of these constraints to trade, which are not 
separately represented within the model. 
Hydrological and environmental constraints on trade 
Without regulatory, institutional and economic constraints, hydrological factors 
(such as the paths and linkages of rivers) would limit where and when water can be 
used and traded. It is also often thought that gravity provides a binding constraint to     




trade. However, while gravity provides a significant impediment to the movement 
of water (given the costs of transporting water upstream), and most irrigation water 
in the MDB is delivered via gravity distribution systems, it may not always 
constrain trade since the three main rivers of the southern MDB are hydrologically 
linked (box 2.1). 
The Murray and Murrumbidgee rivers share a common catchment in the Snowy 
Mountains. The Snowy Mountain Scheme’s dam and channel infrastructure make it 
possible to divert water (at the margin) from one river to another. More importantly, 
because the Goulburn and Murrumbidgee rivers are tributaries of the Murray, it is 
possible to trade water between each river above their confluences (intersections) 
(box 2.2). 
 
Box 2.1  Trading water upstream  
Although water cannot run uphill (and the feasibility of pumping or ‘trucking’ water is 
limited), irrigation water can be traded upstream as well as downstream. This is 
because allocations and entitlements can be traded across the same basin before 





























Assume River A flows into River Z, and that 150 gigalitres per year of irrigation water 
can be released from a dam on the head waters of River A. Assume also that there is 
an initial allocation of 100 gigalitres to irrigators on River A and 50 gigalitres to 
irrigators on River Z. Irrigators on River A could trade with other irrigators on River A, 
and with irrigators on River Z. In the diagram, it is assumed that there is a net trade of 
5 gigalitres from River Z upstream to River A. This would mean that 105 gigalitres 
could be used by irrigators on River A, and 45 gigalitres by irrigators on River Z, but the 
total volume released from the dam on River A would remain at 150 gigalitres.   
 
 
A further constraint on the volume of trade can be congestion in the distribution 
network, such that moving greater than a certain volume of water is either 
physically infeasible (given current technologies) or likely to create severe 
environmental problems (table  2.5). These constraints can vary in significance 
between and within seasons. Congestion may be a problem only during a relatively 
small number of peak demand days.      





Box 2.2  Trading water between rivers 
While it may not be feasible to move water between some rivers, trade in the use of 
water can occur where rivers are inter-connected, although an ‘intermediary’ may be 
needed. Continuing the example given in box 2.1, assume River B also flows into River 
Z, and that 200 gigalitres per year of irrigation water can be released from a dam on 
the head waters of the River B of which there is an initial allocation of 125 gigalitres to 


















































Further, assume it is desired to trade a net 5 gigalitres from River A to River B. This 
could occur by first trading 5 gigalitres from River A downstream to River Z, then by 
trading the same volume upstream from River Z to River B. In effect, an extra 5 
gigalitres would be used on River B in exchange for 5 gigalitres less being used on 
River A, such that the amount flowing in River Z remains unchanged. As a result, in 
that season, 95 gigalitres would be used on River A, 130 gigalitres on River B and 125 
gigalitres on River Z (sourced 55 gigalitres from River A and 70 gigalitres from River Z). 
It should be noted that the net trade between Rivers A and B does not have to balance. 
However, trades would be limited by: 
•  the maximum flow of the exporting river (River A) minus its contribution to the 
combined river (River Z) 
•  the contribution of the importing river (River B) to the combined river (River Z).  
In this example, 75 gigalitres could be traded from River A to River B. However, 
because trade is likely to be at the margin, and successive trades may be in different 
directions, it is unlikely that these limits would be tested. 
In practice, it may be hard for individual irrigators to negotiate such trades because of 
the difficulties in locating potential traders on other rivers, and any necessary 
‘intermediaries’. However, there are several methods by which the trading process 
could be facilitated. One method would be to allow arbitrageurs (whether irrigators or 
not) to trade in seasonal allocations, hence increasing the number of possible market 
participants. Another could be to create a ‘clearing house’ which listed offers to buy 
and sell seasonal allocations on all connected rivers in the southern MDB, and 
recorded net transactions between valleys.  
       




Table 2.5  Congestion constraints on major supply networksa 
Location  Daily flow limit (ML) 
River Murray — between the Hume and Yarrawonga weirs  25 000
Barmah Choke — on the River Murray   8 500
Mitta Mitta River — between Dartmouth Dam and the Hume Weir  9 000
Tumut River — between Blowering Dam and the Murrumbidgee River  9 000
a A summary of all channel flow capacities is presented in appendix A, table A.5. 
Source: MDBC, pers. comm., 7 April 2004. 
In some cases, water utilities can avoid these constraints (to some extent) by 
delivering water from upstream to downstream storages before the irrigation season 
and by diverting water around congestion points through other distribution 
channels. If the existing non-physical constraints on water trade were relaxed, 
however, congestion constraints could become more prominent. If so, various 
mechanisms exist for expanding capacity or for prioritising use of limited capacity 
(PC 2003).  
If trade results in changed downstream water flows, it may impose costs or benefits 
on downstream users such as altered salinity patterns (see, for example, Beare and 
Heaney 2002, and Bell and Heaney 2001). Irrigation districts and state governments 
may regulate trade to manage externality problems, although some districts are 
using other policy instruments that may be more effective and efficient (such as 
taxes or tradeable salinity credits). 
Economic or ‘market-based’ constraints 
Poorly defined rights of access to water are said to be a key impediment to trade 
(Hassall & Associates in association with Musgrave 2002). If so, uncertainty over 
future water allocations may deter irrigators from selling entitlements, and from 
entering into longer-term seasonal allocation contracts, so as to hedge against any 
future reductions in their entitlements.  
Other important constraints to trade are a lack of reliable information and, in some 
cases, a poor understanding of trading markets. In many cases, irrigation and water 
authorities are not required to keep or share information that is useful to buyers and 
sellers, such as prices of recent trades. Different definitions of tradeable water — in 
terms of reliability and tenure — may discourage trade in entitlements. Further, lack 
of a clearing house may hinder trade in both entitlements and seasonal allocations. 
For example, although there is at least one electronic exchange for each water 
utility, these may not list inter-valley trading opportunities, nor are there links to 
other exchanges. However, brokers also facilitate trade within irrigation districts, 
and it is possible that they may facilitate trade between districts.     




The trade in entitlements is characterised by a relatively small number of 
participants (Crase, O’Reilly and Dollery 2000). Such market ‘thinness’ could 
hinder competition in water trade and increase transaction costs. The spatial and 
temporal differences in water flows, and the heterogeneity of demands for it, can 
exacerbate this problem (Colby, Crandall and Bush 1993).  
Administrative and regulatory arrangements affecting trade  
Administrative and regulatory arrangements constrain trade within and between 
irrigation districts. The arrangements are set at both the state and district levels. 
Such arrangements appear to be imposed for a variety of reasons including 
perceived: 
•  hydrological limitations to water movement 
•  environmental impacts of changing the current patterns of the supply and use of 
water 
•  concerns over ‘stranded assets’ 
•  social and economic adjustment costs associated with water being exported from 
particular districts. 
In some districts, some regulations are designed to manage broader policy goals. 
For example, Murrumbidgee Irrigation appear to use a variety of trade rules to 
manage MIA compliance with the MDB Cap. 
In New South Wales and Victoria there is a combination of high level government 
regulation and localised regulation by water utilities. In South Australia, Trust 
boards formulate most rules affecting water trading, although government 
regulations apply in the few government irrigation districts awaiting privatisation.  
All trades must be approved by the appropriate authority. Most trades are approved 
unless they contravene environmental objectives or reduce the water use and supply 
reliability to other irrigators. Trades in entitlements tend to be subject to more 
scrutiny than trades in seasonal allocations given that an entitlement trade is likely 
to be long term.  
While most constraints apply to the nature and extent of trades, some determine 
which parties can undertake trades — such as the requirement for a purchaser to 
own land that can be irrigated (as in Victoria), or hold a water entitlement before 
engaging in seasonal trades.      




Regulation of trade in seasonal allocations 
In general, there are few regulatory arrangements constraining trade in seasonal 
allocations within an irrigation district. Some that do exist appear to be based on 
hydrological or environmental constraints.  
Examples of intra-district regulatory arrangements include the: 
•  MIA’s provision that selling a seasonal allocation removes access to any 
carryover water 
•  GMW district rule that irrigators are not allowed to trade more than 30 per cent 
of sales water and that those who do trade are unable to use the balance.  
Generally, there appears to be more constraints to trade in seasonal allocations 
between irrigation districts than within districts. For example, the New South Wales 
Water Allocation Plan 2003–2004 for the Murray-Lower Darling Valleys specifies 
that: 
Due to the low water availability in both the Murray and Murrumbidgee River valleys 
at the start of the 2003–2004 seasons, there will be no temporary (annual) trades 
between these valleys. This restriction may be relaxed with a significant improvement 
in available water resources. (DIPNR 2003, p. 14) 
This rule appears to be temporary in nature to reflect the prolonged unseasonal 
conditions currently experienced in New South Wales, and there are no equivalent 
rules for intra-district or interstate trade. In addition, the plan prohibits the sale of 
water from districts above the Barmah Choke to districts below the Barmah Choke 
if the sale requires that additional water to be delivered down stream of the Barmah 
Choke during periods of peak demand — a similar rule also applies for Victorian 
irrigators. 
Regulation of trade in water entitlements 
There appear to be few regulatory arrangements constraining trade in water 
entitlements within an irrigation district. Some of these appear to be based on 
hydrological or environmental factors. For example, similar rules relating to the 
seasonal allocation trade via the Barmah Choke also apply to the trade in 
entitlements. 
Examples of constraints on inter-district trade are:  
•  In New South Wales, only high security entitlements can be traded interstate; 
also high security entitlements converted from general security cannot be traded 
interstate for five years from the date of the conversion.      




•  In Victoria, annual net exports of entitlements are limited to ‘two percent of the 
total volume of water rights’ for most irrigation districts (the same regulation 
prevents net trade from the Murray system to the Goulburn system and from the 
Goulburn system to the Campaspe system).  
•  In the MI district, trades in entitlements to Victoria and the Murrumbidgee 
valley are currently not permitted. 
Again similar rules affecting water flows through the Barmah Choke apply in NSW 
and Victoria for inter district trade of entitlements. For example: 
•  Interstate trade in entitlements is only permitted in irrigation districts included in 
the Murray-Darling Basin Pilot Interstate Trading Scheme. The main areas 
excluded in the southern MDB are irrigation districts above the Barmah Choke 
(including the MI district and some sub districts of the GMW district). 
Appendix C provides a more detailed listing of regulatory arrangements for the 
transfer of water allocations and entitlements for selected States and water utilities. 
Summary and implications  
Markets for trading water are enabling water to be reallocated to more productive 
uses. However, there are a number of constraints to trade. While some arrangements 
constraining trade appear to be hydrologically and/or environmentally based (such 
as curtailing downstream trade through the Barmah Choke), others may be designed 
to address broader issues. 
In general, trade in seasonal allocations and entitlements within a district are less 
constrained by regulatory arrangements than trade between districts. Also, trade in 
seasonal allocations is less constrained than trade in entitlements. If markets for 
seasonal water allocations continue to develop, further productivity gains may be 
made even if trades in water entitlements remain constrained.      





3  Overview of the modelling approach 
TERM is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Australian 
economy that the Centre of Policy Studies at Monash University developed 
(box 3.1). The economy is classified into 144 industry sectors and 57 regions. Each 
region is modelled as a separate economy with links to the other regions to account 
for product and factor mobility between regions. TERM draws on national input-
output data and disaggregated regional data. 
 
Box 3.1  Regional CGE modelling of water trade and use 
Multi-region, multi-sector CGE models of Australia can demonstrate the widespread 
flow-on and feedback effects that are likely to occur throughout the economy as a 
result of changes in water trading arrangements and water use. Such changes are 
likely to vary across regions and can have national ‘macro’ effects (for example, effects 
on international trade). Regional CGE models capture the regional and national effects 
resulting from a region-specific change. 
Regional models generally contain (1) a detailed description of the structure of the 
economy at the regional level and (2) a set of mechanisms that describe the economic 
behaviour of five types of agent in the economy: producers, investors (capital creators), 
households, government and foreigners. In these models, each region is modelled as a 
separate economy with links to the other regions to account for product and factor 
mobility between regions. The models calculate changes at the national level by 
aggregating changes for each region, so are characterised as ‘bottoms up’ models.  
The two main multi-region models for Australia are the Monash Multi-Regional 
Forecasting model (MMRF) and TERM. MMRF uses states and territories as regional 
economies. Each region may then be disaggregated (post-simulation) to the statistical 
division level.  
TERM was developed as a more disaggregated tool than MMRF, for regional policy 
analysis. It can be used to model each of Australia’s 57 statistical divisions as a distinct 
economy with its own input–output and trade relationships.  
Further details of the structure of TERM are available in Horridge, Madden and Wittwer 
(2003) and Wittwer (2003). 
 
     




Development of a water module within TERM 
To improve understanding of the likely regional impacts of water policy reform, the 
Productivity Commission and a consortium of other agencies funded the Centre of 
Policy Studies to incorporate a representation of the irrigation sector within TERM, 
resulting in TERM-Water. This new model explicitly recognises water as a factor of 
production for irrigated agricultural industries by incorporating stylised hierarchical 
production relationships between water and other factor inputs such as labour and 
capital. It also represents water as a tradeable asset among irrigators (box 3.2).  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) water accounts (2000), representing 
water use in 1996–97, are used to define water allocation and use within the model 
— hence, 1996–97 is referred to as the ‘base year’ for this analysis. New accounts 
for 2000–01 were released in May 2004 but were not incorporated into the TERM 
database for this modelling exercise. 
As part of the model development, TERM has been reconfigured to 48 industry 
sectors and 20 regions to provide TERM-Water with a detailed representation of 
irrigated industries in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) (appendix B 
tables B.4 and B.5). Irrigated sectors include: sheep, other broad acre, beef cattle, 
dairy cattle, rice, cotton, four different fruits, three different forms of grape 
production, irrigated pasture, vegetables and other crops. Regions outside the MDB 
have been aggregated to the state or ‘rest of state’ level. The model has retained 
disaggregation to statistical division level within the MDB (figure 3.1). 
The borders of regions are based on ABS statistical divisions, which have a 
reasonable concordance with existing boundaries of irrigation districts (appendix A, 
table A.2). One notable exception is the area supplied by Goulburn Murray Water, 
which lies partly in the Mallee region, as well as providing the vast majority of 
irrigation water in the Goulburn, Ovens Murray and Loddon Campaspe regions. 
In TERM-Water, a variety of products are produced within each region. Each 
regional farm is specialised, in that it produces only one output and by only one 
technique. (Irrigated grapes and non-irrigated grapes, for example, are produced by 
different farms.) In the model there is no threshold for use of a particular input 
(such as water) below which production ceases. Land, labour and capital are mobile 
to varying degrees in TERM-Water. When water allocations and prices change, the 
output mix of a region thus changes in response, and these specialised farms expand 
or shrink as needed. For this reason, despite the difference between the way in 
which farms are modelled in TERM-Water and the way in which farming is 
organised in the real world of the agricultural sector, TERM-Water can model 
changes in product mixes and inputs.     





TERM-Water has only one such specialised farm per region — for example, all the 
fields devoted to wheat in a region are as if they are operated by one farmer — 
therefore some caution is needed in the interpretation of the results. A reduction in 
the output of wheat, for example, is not necessarily a good estimate of what would 
happen to the incomes of real farmers who may have a mix of crops including 
wheat. 
Figure 3.1  Irrigation areas and statistical divisions 
 
Source: Murray-Darling Basin Commission. 
TERM-Water models production and consumption relationships as annual flows of 
goods and services. Changes in water prices and allocations within a year reflect 
changes in annual averages.     





Box 3.2 TERM’s  water  module 
TERM-Water includes irrigation water in production as an endowment rather than as 
an intermediate input and the production of irrigation water is not accounted for in the 
model. Output is produced using a combination of irrigation water and a bundle of non-
water inputs. As represented in the diagram below, each regional irrigation industry has 
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function that allows non-water 
inputs to be substituted for irrigation water in response to changes in their relative 
prices. The elasticity parameter is SIGTOP and usually takes the value 0.01, 0.03 or 
0.05, depending on the industry. For non-irrigation industries, production is proportional 
to non-water inputs because these industries do not use irrigation water. 
The bundle of non-water inputs consists of intermediate inputs, primary factors and 
other costs, used in fixed proportions (as shown in the diagram below). The use of 
particular commodities as intermediate inputs varies with changes in their relative 
prices. The bundle of primary factors consists of capital, labour and land. The 
composition of the primary factor bundle also varies with changes in relative factor 
prices. 
Water utilities are represented as an industry in TERM-Water. This industry produces 
sewerage and drainage services, and delivers non-irrigation water. Purchases from 



























Source: based on Wittwer (2003). 
       





Incorporating water trade 
In TERM-Water, the total water supply available is fixed exogenously. A statistical 
division’s endowment of water within TERM-Water is derived from data on the 
observed use of irrigation water. This means either the initial equilibrium assumes 
that water entitlements, seasonal allocations and use all coincide (so there is no net 
trade) or, more realistically, water use may represent some re-allocation but not 
sufficient to equalise prices across irrigation districts.  
Consequently, the data on use includes water trade that did occur in 1996–97 but 
which is, from the point of view of the model, unobserved. When water availability 
is reduced, however, the model generates estimates of additional trade, thereby 
induced. Soon, the Australian Bureau of Statistics is expected to release data for the 
year 2000–01 on water use (but, again, not on water allocations). For some regions 
of the southern MDB, water availability was lower in 2000–01 than in 1996–97; 
and the water market had developed between the two years. Therefore, the 2000–01 
data on use may incorporate more unobserved trade than do the earlier data. If so, 
(all else being equal) in any model simulations based on later data, reductions in 
water availability would be expected to produce smaller additional water trades than 
those reported in this study. 
In the base year (1996–97), water entitlement holders share the total volume of 
water available according to their priority and entitlement to the resource. Once 
water has been allocated, the current model does not distinguish between a 
megalitre of water conferred from a high security entitlement and one conferred 
from a low security entitlement. Effectively, ‘a megalitre is a megalitre’ within the 
present model.  
Water use is the amount of water that an irrigator uses on a farm. Water may be 
sourced through the seasonal allocations that irrigators receive from their water 
entitlements (at the price charged by the water utility), through water trades or on-
farm resources (including ground water). In the model, the source of the endowment 
of water is not identified.  
The decision on how much water to use or sell is determined by the price at which 
trade is occurring, because this price represents the opportunity cost of using 
allocated water. TERM-Water re-allocates water according to its marginal value 
product between trading groups. This reflects the incentive that irrigators have, in 
the real world, to purchase or sell water until equality is achieved between the water 
trade price and the value of the marginal product of water. Each irrigator then faces 
the same opportunity cost of water because each can chose to buy or sell the right to 
receive water from the water supply company or authority at the market price.     




The model simulates the long run equilibrium allocation of water use across 
industries and regions. In the real world, the re-allocation embodied in this final 
equilibrium can occur through trade in seasonal allocations or trade in water 
entitlements, or both; in the model, there is no such distinction. The implications of 
trade in water on different water sources is not considered (chapter 4). The trading 
price of seasonal allocations and entitlements are likely to be closely related 
(box 3.3). 
 
Box 3.3  The price of water entitlements and seasonal allocations 
Conceptually, the value of a water entitlement is equivalent to the value of an (infinite) 
series of seasonal water allocations. The price of water entitlements can thus be given 













where:  Pent  is the price of water entitlements. 
Palloc,t is the price of seasonal water allocations in period t. 
st  is the entitlement share allocated in period t. 
r  is the interest rate by which future revenues are discounted. 
t  is an annual measure of time. 
Note: The variables st and Palloc,t would be expected to be negatively correlated. 
A high security water entitlement is like a financial asset that pays a high dividend in 
dry (water scarce) years: its value moves contrary to that of some other agricultural 
returns. Some risk averse irrigators may thus prefer to hold such entitlements and 
engage in temporary water allocation trades. They may be willing to pay (or forgo) a 
premium, therefore, to retain high priority entitlements and reduce some uncertainties 
associated with rainfall and storage levels, for example. 
Considerations of uncertainty and risk are absent from the TERM-Water model. If 
variability is removed in shares and allocations, the price of water entitlements can be 











where:  Palloc  is the price of seasonal water allocation in every period. 
In full trading equilibrium, the price of water becomes equal to the (common) value of 
the marginal product of water. 
   
Water and irrigators’ substitution choices 
A critical parameter of the model is irrigators’ choice of input substitution 
possibilities between water and other inputs (box 3.4). Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 
(2004) highlight the complex substitution choices that exist and how they differ 
across major agricultural enterprises such as dairy, rice and perennial horticulture.     






Box 3.4  Water substitution assumptions  
SIGTOP is the input substitutability between water and a bundle of all other inputs. It is 
represented in the production nest as a constant elasticity of substitution (the top-most 
CES production function in box 3.2). A very low value of SIGTOP means there is little 
substitutability between water and the non-water aggregate input: even if the price of 
water rises significantly, the ratio of inputs used remains relatively unchanged. 
The assumed value of SIGTOP affects the way in which an industry reacts to the 
increased scarcity of water and thus to water’s increased price. A higher elasticity of 
substitution means farms can more readily move to those inputs that are relatively 
cheaper. Consequently, as water quantities used in production fall, the output of a farm 
can readily be maintained by increasing the intensity of capital, land and/or labour use. 
This means the effects of water quantity shocks are ‘diluted’. 
For all irrigated industries in TERM-Water, SIGTOP is assumed to be low, reflecting 
the importance of water as an input to production (little scope for substituting between 
water and other inputs). For each of these industries, SIGTOP takes one of three 
possible values. In each irrigation region, SIGTOP is assumed to be 0.01 for the rice 
growing industry and 0.05 for the beef and dairy industries. For all other industries in 
the irrigation regions, SIGTOP is assumed to be 0.03. Sensitivity testing is performed 
on these parameter value choices (see chapter 4 and appendix B). 
Higher parameter values allocated to particular industries account for the greater 
opportunities that the industries have to substitute other inputs for water. The dairy 
industry, for example, can purchase feed grains (which may not be derived from 
irrigated farming) for (irrigated) pasture and thus has been allocated a higher SIGTOP 
value than that for most other industries. 
   
Trade restrictions 
A number of examples of trade restrictions were presented in chapter 2. These are 
not separately identified in the model. In the model, trade restrictions are used to 
broadly represent these trade constraints in total. 
Aside from the prices charged for water by utilities, the determinants of the rents 
accruing to holders of water entitlements include the productivity of and relative 
scarcity of water in each region. When water trade is unrestricted within a region, 
the observed water price will be the value of the marginal product of water (which 
would be common to all water using industries in the region, adjusting for 
differential delivery costs). Similarly, water price differentials occur across regions 
if trade is restricted, and would disappear if restrictions were removed (box 3.5).  
The issue of congestion is handled outside the model. Results are checked to ensure 
average annual water trade volumes do not breach the congestion constraints.     





Box 3.5  Illustrative gains from trade in water 
The diagram below shows gains from water trade that would occur if barriers 
preventing the re-allocation of water were removed and free trade occurred between 
two regions. The horizontal axis shows the total quantity of irrigation water available 
and its distribution between the two regions. Diminishing returns to water in both 
regions implies the value of the marginal product of water (VMP) schedule for each 
region slopes downwards from the relevant origin.  
Initially, region 1 has an available quantity of water given by Qno trade and the remaining 
water is used by region 2. Under this allocation, production revenue for region 1 is 
given by the area a+b+c+d and revenue for region 2 is given by the area f+g (unless 
water is supplied to irrigators at zero charge, its cost must be deducted to obtain net 
revenue). At Qno trade, VMPregion 2 is greater than VMPregion 1. 
Removing the restrictions in trade results in some water use shifting via trade from 
relatively low value use (at the margin) in region 1 to relatively high value use in region 
2. This reallocation of water continues until VMPregion 1 equals VMPregion 2. That is, the 
final allocation of water occurs at Qfree trade. Production revenue for region 1 is now 
given by area a+b+c and revenue for region 2 is d+e+f+g. The area e shows the net 
total gain from trade in water resulting from the removal of barriers to water trade. The 
part of the net total gain accruing to irrigators in region 1 would be Pfree trade·(Qno trade – 
Qfree trade) less area d, with the remainder accruing to irrigators in region 2. 
The above analysis makes standard partial equilibrium assumptions. These include 
zero transaction costs in trading water. It is also assumed that the VMP schedules 
correspond to social valuations as well as private (irrigator) ones. That is, there are no 
externalities from the use of water, so the barriers to water trade could not have been 
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The economic impacts of expanding trade in the southern MDB are estimated by 
comparing the effects of reductions in water availability under various water trade 
assumptions. In the model, water is permanently removed from use by agricultural 
industries and is not re-allocated to any other sector. The value of this water is not 
explicitly valued in the model. The increased opportunities for re-adjustment that 
exist under expanded trade would mean reductions in water availability would have 
different effects than in the presence of restricted water trade. With water trade, 
those industries and regions in which water generates relatively low values of 
marginal product will sell water to those where it has higher marginal value. 
In long run simulations using TERM-Water, labour and capital are mobile between 
industries and regions, and will tend to follow the water trade flows. Land is also 
assumed to be mobile between industries within a region. Under a reduction in 
water availability, national gross domestic product would be larger, therefore, than 
if trade were prevented, but the gross regional product could be larger or smaller. 
In short run simulations, capital is fixed and the ability for labour to migrate 
between industries and regions is reduced. This means that for a given water 
allocation reduction, the southern MDB may not have as significant reduction in 
GRP in the short run as in the long run, because in the short run capital and labour 
inputs cannot leave the southern MDB to seek higher returns in other parts of 
Australia. 
Each simulation compares three trade experiments that differ by the type of 
additional water trades allowed to occur (box 3.6). The sensitivity of the results to 
variations in some parameters of the model and to changes in the level and 
distribution of reductions in irrigation water allocations is then assessed 
(appendix B).     





Box 3.6  Trade experiments conducted using TERM 
The following three trade experiments were compared to examine the impact of 
expanding trade. They differ by the type of additional water trades they allow to occur. 
‘No  trade’  —  water cannot be re-allocated between industries or regions, so every 
industry uses only the water that it is allocated (a). 
‘Intra-regional trade only’ —  water re-allocation can occur among industries in the same 
region, but regions cannot export or import water to/from other regions (b). 
‘Intra- and interregional trade’ — water can freely flow among all trading regions and all 
industries within these regions (c). 
The diagrams below use shading to illustrate the water trade areas in each experiment. 
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4  Long run effects of reduced water 
availability with trade 
This chapter summarises the results of the long run TERM-Water simulations 
specified in the previous chapter. It also presents the sensitivity of the results to 
underlying model and experiment assumptions, and outlines some model design 
features that must be noted when considering the results. 
Reductions of 10  per  cent, 20  per  cent and 30  per  cent in irrigation water 
availability in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) are modelled. Initially all 
industries in all regions are assumed to face the same percentage declines in water 
availability. This means industries and regions that use larger volumes of water face 
larger volumetric reductions than those with lower use. An alternative distribution 
of reductions in water availability is later considered. 
Three trade experiments are compared. In the first, irrigators cannot trade within  
or between regions (no trade). In the second, irrigators can trade within regions but 
not between regions (intra-regional trade only). In the third, trade is allowed both 
within and between regions (intra- and interregional trade). The 
10 per cent reduction is used as a reference case for sensitivity testing of model 
assumptions. 
Macroeconomic effects of water trade 
The national macroeconomic effects of reduced water availability vary according to 
the water trade assumptions. Water reductions have the greatest effect if no water 
trade is allowed to occur within or between regions. If trade can occur between 
industries within a region, but the trade between regions is still constrained, then the 
resulting decreases in gross domestic product (GDP) and gross regional product 
(GRP) of the southern MDB are lessened. GDP and GRP effects are further reduced 
if both intra- and interregional water trade can occur. Moving from no trade to intra- 
and interregional trade together more than halves the impact of the reductions in 
water on the gross regional product (GRP) of the southern MDB. 
The relative gains from allowing intra-regional trade, and intra- and interregional 
trade are remarkably similar between the different allocation reductions (see 
table  4.1). For example, the effects of moving from intra-regional trade only to 
allowing both intra- and interregional trade on southern MDB GRP are reduced by     




23, 24 and 22 per cent, when water allocations are cut by 10, 20 and 30 per cent 
respectively. There is a 98 per cent correlation between the trade effects on GRP 
resulting from the various per cent reductions in water availability. 
The regional effects of a ten per cent reduction in water availability in the southern 
MDB are not large. Larger cuts in water availability have disproportionately larger 
effects on GRP and GDP. Doubling the cut in allocation more than doubles the 
effect on GRP for each region in the southern MDB and on national GDP 
(table 4.2). When intra- and interregional trade are both permitted, for example, a 
10 per cent cut in water allocations reduces GRP for the southern MDB by 0.52 per 
cent, a 20 per cent cut reduces it by 1.17 per cent, and a 30 per cent cut decreases it 
by 2.02 per cent — almost four times the loss from the 10 per cent cut. 
Table 4.1  GDP and GRP effects of trade after water availability reductions 
of different magnitudes 
  Relative effects of moving  
from no trade to allowing 
 intra-regional trade only a 
Relative effects of moving from
 intra-regional trade only to 
 allowing interregional trade b 












 %  %  %    %  %  %
New South Wales       
Murrumbidgee 49 52 52    –32  –32  –32
Murray 41  43  43    –35  –34  –34
Victoria        
Mallee 49  57  61    42  38  31
Goulburn 16  21  22    56  55  52
Loddon Campaspe  25  30  34    42  36  26
Ovens Murray  22  30  36    70  72  71
South Australia       
Murray  Lands  21 29 33   75 76  75
Southern MDB  35 40 42   23 24  22
Australia  31 36 39   22 30  32
a  Proportional difference between GRP/GDP changes in the no trade and intra-regional trade only 
experiments. b Proportional difference between GRP/GDP changes in the intra-regional trade only and intra- 
and interregional trade experiments. 
Source: Tables 4.4, D.10 and D11. 
Further analysis of a specific case 
In the following sections, detailed analysis is provided of a 10 per cent reduction in 
irrigation water availability. In particular, information is provided on sectoral and 
regional impacts, as well as the results of variations in some of the key assumptions 
of the model as part of sensitivity testing.  
  31 
Table 4.2  GDP and GRP effects under different trade and water availability experimentsa 
  10 per cent reduction  
in water availability 
  20 per cent reduction 
 in water availability 
  30 per cent reduction 
 in water availability 
 No  tradeb Intra- tradec Inter- traded No  tradeb Intra- tradec Inter- traded No  tradeb Intra- tradec Inter- traded
 % % %    %  %  %   % %  %
New South Wales                    
Murrumbidgee –1.29  –0.66  –0.87    –3.02 –1.45 –1.92 –5.11 –2.45  –3.23 
Murray –1.52  –0.90  –1.21    –3.48 –1.98 –2.65 –5.78 –3.30  –4.42 
Victoria                
Mallee –1.39  –0.71  –0.41    –3.67 –1.57 –0.98 –6.64 –2.59  –1.78 
Goulburn –1.07  –0.90  –0.39    –2.63 –2.09 –0.94 –4.57 –3.54  –1.72 
Loddon Campaspe  –0.30  –0.22  –0.13    –0.70 –0.49 –0.31 –1.18 –0.78  –0.58 
Ovens Murray  –0.24  –0.19  –0.06   –0.66 –0.46 –0.13  –1.26  –0.81  –0.24 
South Australia                    
Murray Lands  –1.50  –1.18  –0.30    –4.08 –2.89 –0.70 –7.48 –4.99  –1.27 
Southern MDB  –1.04 –0.67 –0.52    –2.55 –1.53 –1.17 –4.43 –2.58  –2.02 
Australia  –0.008 –0.006 –0.004    –0.027 –0.017 –0.012 –0.059 –0.036  –0.024 
a GDP includes market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as 
with other regions in the southern MDB. 
Source: Tables 4.4, D.10 and D.11. 
 
     




Re-allocation of water with trade 
As water becomes scarcer, its relative value (opportunity cost) increases. With intra- 
and interregional trade, irrigators can respond by moving water between industries 
and regions. Irrigators with higher water intensities (water use per unit of output) in 
production, those with water expenditures representing a higher proportion of total 
costs, and those for whom other inputs can be substituted more easily for water (that 
is, with higher SIGTOP values) are more likely to use less water and to sell unused 
water to generate income. As water moves to different industries and regions, 
labour and capital tend to move with it, increasing the growth effects in importing 
regions and increasing the falls in output in exporting regions. Within a region, land 
can also be re-allocated between industries to some degree (appendix B). 
The top panel of table 4.3 summarises the patterns of net water trade (exports minus 
imports) under intra-regional trade. When trade is allowed within a region, the rice 
and dairy industries in most regions reduce water use and become net sellers of 
water to the remaining (net purchasing) industries.  
With only intra-regional trade permitted, the opportunity cost of water differs across 
regions (appendix D, table D.3). When trade is allowed between regions as well as 
within regions, prices equalise and industries that were net sellers of water under 
intra-regional trade tend to become net exporters to water purchasing industries in 
other regions (see the lower panel of table 4.3). Similarly, interregional trade allows 
industries purchasing water under intra-regional trade to become net importers of 
water.  
The Murrumbidgee and Murray regions are estimated to be net exporters (each 
exporting in excess of 46 gigalitres of water) and the Murray Lands and northern 
Victorian regions are likely to be net importers of the water — reflecting the 
distribution of industries across regions. Water is primarily exported from the rice 
industry in the Murrumbidgee and Murray regions, with almost all industries in the 
importing regions being purchasers of water. (An individual industry can be a net 
exporter in one region while being a net importer in another. This happens when the 
‘exporting’ region has plentiful water, compared with the ‘importing’ region). 
Total net water trade within the southern MDB is a relatively small share of total 
water allocations, with only 2.3 per cent of total allocations traded among regions. 
Similarly, net water exports or imports from a region are a small percentage of total 
water allocations in that region (table 4.3). Imports to the Murray Lands region, for 
example, represent approximately 8 per cent of total allocations in that region, while 
exports from the Murrumbidgee region represent around 4 per cent of total 
allocations for that region.     




Table 4.3  Net water trades among industries in the southern MDBa 
After a 10 per cent reduction in water availability 
 







  ML ML ML ML ML ML  ML
Intra-regional trade only      
Sheep  10 601  7 735  1 857  1 614  2 324  0  303
  (8.0%) (8.2%) (3.2%) (6.7%) (6.5%)  –  (5.2%)
14 347  13 651  209  473  –528  5  66 Other 
broadacre  (7.6%) (7.9%) (7.7%) (4.8%)  (–3.4%) (7.4%)  (5.2%)
Beef cattle  4 796  3 967  45  783  320  299  –6
  (6.4%) (6.9%) (0.2%) (0.7%) (1.7%) (3.7%) (–0.1%)
Dairy cattle  736  6 613  –17 518  –8 072  –352  –531  –5 309
  (6.9%)  (6.6%) (–8.3%) (–1.6%) (–0.9%) (–1.3%)  (–9.9%)
Rice  –52 730  –43 926  –64  –709  0  0  0
  (–8.2%) (–5.6%) (–9.1%)  (–12.9%)  –  –  –
11 962  5 757  13 964  3 604  97  60  4 150 Perennial 
horticulture  (10.2%) (9.9%) (7.3%) (5.2%) (1.7%) (0.5%)  (2.3%)
672 1  094  –631  503  267  82  –200 Irrigated 
pasture  (7.7%) (7.6%)  (–4.1%) (1.4%) (2.2%) (2.3%) (–5.4%)
Vegetables  2 690  1 774  1 148  859  275  0  793
  (8.2%) (8.5%) (7.0%) (5.8%) (7.2%)  –  (4.1%)
Other crops  6 928  3 334  989  945  –2 402  85  203
  (6.6%) (6.9%) (7.2%) (3.8%)  (–5.8%) (7.0%)  (4.6%)
Total  0 0 0 0 0 0  0
  (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)  (0%)
Intra- and interregional trade     
Sheep  9 208  6 673  3 811  2 142  2 959  0  530
  (7.0%) (7.1%) (6.5%) (8.9%) (8.2%)  –  (9.0%)
11 996  11 343  256  833  484  7  120 Other 
broadacre  (6.4%) (6.5%) (9.4%) (8.4%) (3.1%)  (10.0%)  (9.5%)
Beef cattle  3 457  2 905  1 271  6 452  995  668  349
  (4.6%) (5.0%) (4.7%) (6.0%) (5.3%) (8.2%)  (7.3%)
Dairy cattle  420  3 294  –121  24 748  1 420  2 809  2 623
  (3.9%) (3.3%)  (–0.1%) (4.9%) (3.6%) (6.7%)  (4.9%)
Rice  –89 692  –91 627  64  658  0  0  0
  (–14.0%)  (–11.6%)  (9.1%)  (12.0%) – –  –
9 887  4 907  16 528  5 666  322  939  15 107 Perennial 
horticulture  (8.5%) (8.5%) (8.7%) (8.2%) (5.5%) (7.6%)  (8.5%)
494 755 393  2  392 689 294  241 Irrigated 
pasture  (5.7%) (5.2%) (2.5%) (6.5%) (5.6%) (8.1%)  (6.5%)
Vegetables  2 329  1 533  1 414  1 256  330  0  1 706
  (7.1%) (7.3%) (8.6%) (8.4%) (8.6%)  –  (8.7%)
Other crops  5 161  2 484  1 208  1 903  497  115  394
  (4.9%) (5.2%) (8.8%) (7.6%) (1.2%) (9.6%)  (9.0%)
Total  –46 741  –57 734  24 824  46 051  7 696  4 832  21 071
  (–3.6%)  (–4.3%) (4.6%) (5.7%) (4.5%) (7.1%)  (7.8%)
a Percentages in parentheses are net trades as a proportion of water allocations. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations.     





Without trade in water, a 10 per cent reduction in water availability reduces GRP of 
the southern MDB by 1.04 per cent ($356 million in 2003) (table 4.4). That is, 
relatively small reductions in GRP occur despite the assumption that other 
productive inputs are not readily substitutable for water. With trade permitted in 
each region, the reduction in GRP is less, at 0.67 per cent; it is less again, at 
0.52 per cent, when trade in water is allowed also between regions.  
Table 4.4  GRP and GDP effects under different trade experimentsa 












Relative effects of 
moving from no trade 
to allowing intra-
regional trade only e 
Relative effects of moving 
from intra-regional trade 
only to allowing 
interregional trade f
  % % %  %  %
New South Wales      
Murrumbidgee  –1.29 –0.66 –0.87  49  –32
Murray  –1.52 –0.90 –1.21  41  –35
Victoria       
Mallee  –1.39 –0.71 –0.41  49  42
Goulburn  –1.07 –0.90 –0.39  16  56
Loddon 
Campaspe 
–0.30 –0.22 –0.13  25  42
Ovens  Murray  –0.24 –0.19 –0.06  22  70
South Australia      
Murray  Lands  –1.50 –1.18 –0.30  21  75
Southern MDB  –1.04 –0.67 –0.52  35  23
Australia  –0.008 –0.006 –0.004  31  22
a GDP includes market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade 
permitted between industries within the same region or between regions. c  Trade permitted between 
industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same 
region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference between the first and 
second columns. f Proportional difference between the second and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations. 
All regions’ GRP losses are reduced from allowing intra-regional trade. Under a 
10 per cent reduction in water availability, the loss in GRP is 16–49 per cent less 
than in the no trade experiment (table 4.4). Allowing interregional trade as well as 
intra-regional trade further reduces the GRP losses in most regions. The Murray 
Lands region in South Australia and northern Victorian regions become net water 
importing regions and experience reduced losses in GRP, moving from intra-
regional trade only to allowing trade between as well as within regions. The 
Murrumbidgee and Murray regions in New South Wales experience larger declines 
in GRP (by 32 per cent and 35 per cent respectively) with expanded trade as the two 
regions export water.      




The differences in the effects of trade on individual regions depend on differences 
in the price of water and value of marginal product of water between regions. The 
regional distribution of the water purchasing and water selling industries will reflect 
these differences (appendix D, tables D.1 and D.2). The effects of trade on GRP are 
larger for regions with a higher proportion of water sales to allocations than for 
regions where the proportion is low. Water selling industries (such as rice) are 
concentrated in the Murrumbidgee and Murray regions, while water purchasers 
(such as dairy and horticulture) are located in the northern Victorian regions (except 
for dairy in the Murray Lands region). As water is exported from a region, capital 
and labour also move to the regions that import the water (table 4.5). Unlike water, 
under ‘no trade’ capital and labour can move between regions. With larger intra-
regional effects on industry under no trade, capital and labour also respond by larger 
movements from the regions. For example, capital and labour in the Murrumbidgee 
region decline 1.9 per cent and 1.0 per cent respectively under ‘no trade’, both more 
than with water trade. 
Table 4.5  Changes in regional primary factor use 
After a 10 per cent reduction in water availability 
  Intra-regional trade  
only a 
  Intra- and 
interregional trade b 
   
Difference c 
  Water Capital Labour  Water Capital Labour  Water Capital  Labour
 % % % % % % % % % 
New South Wales          
Murrumbidgee  –10 –1.3 –0.4  –13.2 –1.8 –0.6 –3.2 –0.5  –0.2
Murray  –10 –1.8 –0.6  –13.8 –2.5 –0.9 –3.8 –0.7  –0.3
Victoria          
Mallee  –10 –1.0 –0.7 –5.8 –0.5  –0.4 4.2 0.4  0.3
Goulburn  –10 –1.3 –0.8 –4.8 –0.6 –0.4  5.2  0.7  0.4
Loddon  Campaspe  –10 –0.3 –0.2 –6.0 –0.2 –0.1  4.0  0.1  0.1
Ovens  Murray  –10 –0.3 –0.2 –3.6  –0.1 0.0 6.4 0.2  0.1
South Australia          
Murray  Lands  –10 –1.6 –1.2 –3.0 –0.4 –0.3  7.0  1.2  0.9
a Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. b Trade permitted between 
industries in the same region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB. c The percentage point 
difference between the corresponding columns for the two experiments. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations. 
Within Victoria, under a 10 per cent reduction in water availability, the Goulburn 
and Mallee regions (which have a higher share of dairy output) experience a larger 
decline in output than that experienced by those regions with a larger share of 
perennial horticulture industries.  
Also dampening the impacts of the reduction in water availability are the second 
and third round impacts on other agricultural industries that are not major water     




users. The effects on GRP of contracting irrigated industries, for example, are partly 
offset by growth in non-irrigated agricultural industries (such as wheat, barley and 
other crops) as labour and capital are freed to move to those industries.  
Sectoral impacts 
The primary sector accounts for most of the fall in industry value added after a 
reduction in water availability. Under a 10 per cent reduction, and allowing only 
intra-regional trade the primary sector accounts for 65 per cent of the relatively 
small decline in GRP in the southern MDB. Growth in the (non-food processing) 
manufacturing sector and income from water sales lessen this impact (appendix D, 
table D.5). With interregional trade, the primary sector contributes 72 per cent to the 
overall decline in GRP. This is because expanding water trade allows primary 
industries in some regions to substitute water sales for output sales as a source of 
income. As income sources change, output, employment and capital used in these 
industries declines as water trade expands and, as local primary industries contract, 
other industries (in, say, the food processing sector) switch the source of their inputs 
to other regions or overseas.  
Local labour and capital become cheaper as wages and returns to capital decline 
when these factors are released from declining primary industries. Cheaper labour 
and capital reduce production costs for food processing, so food processing output 
in the southern MDB declines less under expanded trade. However, the smaller 
decline in the region’s food processing is not sufficient to absorb all of the capital 
and labour released from primary industries as water trade expands. As a result, 
with national employment unchanged, remaining unused labour is absorbed by 
industries in other regions and output there expands. 
In Victoria, primary industries contract less because they import water from New 
South Wales. The Victorian food processing sector contracts further as demand for 
its products is increasingly satisfied by food processing industries in New South 
Wales regions. As a result, manufacturing declines, although small, are more 
pronounced in the northern Victorian regions, which have larger food processing 
industries (such as dairy products). The transport industry is an important 
component of the regional services sector and, in most regions, is more affected 
than other service industries by moving from intra-regional trade only to intra- and 
interregional trade. 
As a result of interregional trade, value added in the primary sector and, to lesser 
extent, the service and (non-food processing) manufacturing sectors in some regions 
decline as water trade expands. However, this is less than reductions in value added 
in other regions. Thus, value added for each of these sectors declines less for the     




entire southern MDB, as trade expands (table 4.6). The 10 per cent reduction in 
water availability leads to a 2.29 per cent and 1.91 per cent reduction in primary 
sector production in the southern MDB under intra-regional trade only and intra- 
and interregional trade respectively (appendix D, table D.4). This means that 
expanding water trade lessens the impacts of the water reduction by 16.4 per cent. 
Table 4.6  Sectoral differences in value added from expanded water tradea 
After a 10 per cent reduction in water availability 
 Primary  Food  processing 
Other  
manufacturing  Services
  % % %  %
New South Wales    
Murrumbidgee –40.9  47.7  7.9 –38.1
Murray  –44.7 22.3 42.0 –40.9
Victoria     
Mallee 41.9  47.8  –60.8  43.8
Goulburn 55.7  54.9  –13.7  56.3
Loddon 
Campaspe 
41.5 41.4 –9.5  43.2
Ovens  Murray  74.1 45.8 25.2  68.5
South Australia     
Murray Lands  77.8  63.6  156.6  73.3
Southern MDB  16.4  53.8  3.7  15.4
a Differences are calculated as the percentage difference between the intra-regional trade only experiments 
and the intra- and interregional trade experiment. Changes in sectoral output are presented in appendix D, 
table D.4. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations. 
Industry impacts  
When water availability is reduced by 10 per cent, with or without trade, output 
declines in most industries (appendix D, table D.4). However, in most industries, 
declines in output are lower when intra- and interregional trade is allowed. The 
extent of the effects of trade differs across industries and regions, depending on 
whether trade is confined within regions or allowed across regions. Given the large 
number of industries considered in the model, the focus here is on selected irrigated 
industries that dominate agricultural output in the southern MDB. Results for all 
industries under a 10 per cent reduction in water availability are contained in table 
D.4. 
•  Dairy industry output falls by around 8 per cent under intra-regional trade, and 
by around 4 per cent under intra- and interregional trade.     




•  Perennial horticulture industry output (citrus, apples and pears, stone fruits, 
other fruits and nuts, dryland premium grapes, irrigated premium grapes and 
other grapes) decreases by around 1.4 per cent under intra-regional trade and by 
around 0.7 per cent under intra- and interregional trade. 
•  The output of the rice industry falls by around 15 per cent under intra-regional 
trade and by around 20 per cent under intra- and interregional trade. 
For each industry, there can be significant differences in effects across regions. 
Sensitivity testing 
This section reports the sensitivity of the results to variations in parameters of the 
model and to cuts in total water allocations. The reference case (a 10  per  cent 
reduction in irrigation water availability) was varied by changing: 
•  the input substitutability of water in (1) the rice industry and (2) all industries 
•  the distribution of the allocation reduction. 
Variations to the water substitution assumptions 
Although variations in the assumed value of the substitutability of water lead to 
sizeable variations in industry responses to the cut in water allocations, the effects 
of trade are not much changed. 
In the reference case, the rice industry is assumed to have the lowest input 
substitution elasticity — a SIGTOP parameter value of 0.01. This assumption 
reflects the fewer options available to rice growers to alter inputs in response to 
changing water prices (Wittwer 2003; Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 2004). To test 
the sensitivity of the results to the choice of SIGTOP for the rice industry, the 
SIGTOP parameter value for rice is increased to 0.03. This change marginally 
reduces the impact of the 10 per cent reduction in water availability on the rice 
industry, and slightly increases the benefits from trade to the industry in the 
Murrumbidgee and Murray regions (appendix D, table D.7). 
In further exploration of the sensitivity of results to the specification of SIGTOP, 
the SIGTOP parameter values are increased for all irrigated industries so all can 
more easily substitute other inputs for water. Without trade, this increase in 
substitutability lessens the effects of the reduction in water availability across all 
industries and all regions, and nationally (appendix D, table D.8). Similarly, when 
intra- and interregional trade are allowed, the falls in GRP and GDP from a 10 per 
cent reduction in water availability are less than in the reference case.     




Consequently, the relative percentage effects from intra- and interregional trade are 
of a similar magnitude (but from a smaller base) for each region and nationally. 
A redistribution of the 10 per cent cut in allocation 
This sensitivity test redistributes the 10 per cent reduction in water availability such 
that it is no longer distributed in equal proportions across regions. The 
Murrumbidgee and Murray regions’ allocations are reduced by 20 per  cent and 
25 per cent respectively, the northern Victorian regions each receive a 10 per cent 
increase in allocations, and the allocation to the Murray Lands region decreases by 
3 per cent. This redistribution reflects the generally lower allocations (as a share of 
entitlements) in New South Wales compared with Victoria since 1996–97 
(table 2.1). 
Unsurprisingly, the GRP falls under no trade are larger in the regions experiencing 
larger percentage reductions in water availability, whereas the northern Victorian 
regions experience GRP growth (appendix  D, table  D.6). The effects of intra-
regional trade on GRP are similar to those in the reference case in the 
Murrumbidgee, and Murray regions, but lower in the Goulburn and Loddon 
Campaspe regions. GRP in the Murray and Murrumbidgee regions increases from 
the transition from intra-regional trade alone to intra- and interregional trade 
compared with the reference case, as these regions become net importers of water 
rather than net exporters. In comparison, the northern Victorian and Murray Lands 
regions, although having a higher GRP than in the reference case, experience 
declines in GRP when moving from intra-regional trade to intra- and interregional 
trade, as they become net exporters of water. 
Model design considerations 
In the TERM database, the water use in each industry in each region is assumed to 
equal water allocations. Consequently, the effects of the transition from no trade to 
intra-regional trade have to be carefully interpreted.  
In the model, the industries use exactly the water that they have been allocated: each 
industry in each region has water consumption that is assumed to be its initial 
allocation. The model does not consider how an industry obtained its initial 
endowment — that is, whether by water entitlements or by trade in seasonal 
allocations. It generates trades that are stimulated by reductions in water 
availability. A reduction in water availability means an equal reduction in the 
consumption of the entity experiencing the cut, unless there is trade. Under the no 
trade experiment, no trade (other than the trade outside of the model that led to the     




initial allocations and consumption in the database) is permitted after a reduction in 
water availability. However, in 1996–97, there was some net trade between 
industries within regions, but there was relatively little net trade between regions. 
In addition, some regions and some industries tend to have higher allocations than 
normally required in an average year. Appels, Douglas and Dwyer (2004) argue that 
risk averse irrigators may choose to hold a larger water entitlement than needed to 
meet plant water needs in an average year. For example, many irrigators in the 
Murray Lands region of South Australia have larger entitlements as a buffer against 
dry years; in above average years, such as 1996–97, these irrigators are likely to be 
net exporters of water.  
Consequently, trade patterns predicted in the model may not mirror historical trade 
patterns observed. Another implication is that the database from which the no trade 
experiment results are generated may include some net intra-regional trade in the 
pattern of industry allocations (and small net interregional trade also).  
In the model, the production decisions of industries are based on annualised data 
and do not reflect how choices may change within an irrigation season. If, for 
example, reductions in water availability occur later in the season rather than at the 
start, as assumed in the model, the opportunity costs faced by industries may differ 
from those predicted in the model. In particular, annual crops producers (such as 
rice growers) are likely to face very different opportunity costs of water before 
planting than after planting (Appels, Douglas and Dwyer 2004). 
The model does not include transmission losses of water (which can be caused by 
evaporation and accession to groundwater) associated with the intra- and 
interregional trade of water. The greater the trade between more geographically 
distant regions, the higher are the transmission losses likely to be. In some cases, 
transmission losses may become large, particularly if water is transported through 
open channels to farms distant from an irrigation system (ABARE 2002). The 
estimated effects of trade for the Murray Lands region, for example, are likely to be 
higher than if the model accounted for transmission losses. Nevertheless, 
transmission losses are generally a small share of all water transported (Brewsher 
Consulting 1999). Given that the model predicts relatively small net trades, the 
transmission impacts on net trade are likely to be minor. However, given that the 
model does not estimate the gross trade flows, it is not possible to predict whether 
the transmission losses would be significant. 
In the current model design, only the irrigation industries use water; it is not 
possible to re-allocate the water to (or have it purchased by) other users, such as 
other industries or the environment. Further, the model does not distinguish between 
trade in seasonal water allocations and trade in water entitlements. Consequently, it     




is difficult to test directly the allocative efficiency effects of restricting either type 
of trade. Additionally, it is not possible to assess the impacts on the asset values of 
entitlements and, consequently, their implications for structural adjustment. Finally, 
it is not possible to consider implications of the cap introduced on water 
entitlements in 1995, because the model does not include ‘sleepers’ or ‘dozers’ 
(entitlement holders who do not draw or only occasionally draw their entitlement) 
who could sell unused entitlements. 
The reductions in water availability may occur progressively, and trade may be 
liberalised over time. Given that the model is comparative static, however, it cannot 
assess such temporal scenarios. It can identify net trades between regions, but not 
the total trade flows. While the net trade appears to be relatively small, and 
congestion constraints are thus unlikely to be binding, it is not possible to assess 
how individual congestion constraints may affect trade flows within a year.  
As noted in chapter 2, the majority of water used in the regions considered in the 
model is drawn from utilities. However, some water is from other sources, such as 
groundwater, on-farm storages and overland flows. The model does not distinguish 
the source of the endowment of water, so the reduction in water availability affects 
all water uses, for all sources — it is not exclusive to utility deliveries. A reduction 
in water availability means an identical (pre trade) cut in total consumption of 
water, with the model not allowing for switching to alternative sources. 
In reality, if allocations from utilities were cut and other sources were not 
controlled, then irrigators would be likely to have a strong incentive to access other 
sources. Given the complex hydrological links among groundwater, surface water, 
overland flows and return flows, policy design would need to consider the 
implications of utility allocation cuts on overall water availability (and on third 
party impacts). 
As the results of the model are specific to the experiments undertaken, care is 
needed in extrapolating. The effect on GRP in the southern MDB of a 20 per cent 
reduction in water availability are more than double those of a 10 per cent reduction 
— that is, the effects are not linear. The database year (1996–97) had above average 
allocations — a 10 per cent reduction in water availability in years of below average 
allocations would have larger GRP effects. 
Finally, this analysis does not take into account the impact of changes in water trade 
on environmental conditions such as salinity.  
 
     




5  Short run effects of reduced water 
availability with trade 
Seasonal allocations can vary from year to year, within and between irrigation 
districts (chapter 2, table 2.1). These variations in seasonal allocations can be 
represented within TERM-Water as reductions in water availability relative to the 
base year 1996-97 (table 5.1). 
Table 5.1  Reductions in water availability compared to 1996-97 
Based on observed seasonal allocations 
 1997-98  1998-99  1999-00  2000-01  2001-02
 %  %  %  %  %
Murrumbidgee –8.3  –12.4  –18.0  –10.0  –23.7
Murray –28.9  –20.7  –54.1  –12.0  –15.8
Mallee –14.1  –15.2  –33.8  –16.4  –13.0
Goulburn –22.8  –27.0  –34.3  –25.8  –19.1
Loddon Campaspe  –14.1  –15.2  –33.8  –16.4  –13.0
Ovens Murray  –5.0  –5.0  –5.0  –5.0  –5.0
Murray Lands  –5.0  –5.0  –5.0  –5.0  –5.0
Southern MDB  –17.7  –17.4 –33.2  –14.0  –17.4
Source: PC estimates. 
Each year is modelled separately under short run assumptions with the 
corresponding cuts in allocations assumed to occur only in that year (tables 5.2–
5.6). Consequently, within an individual year some regions face larger cuts in 
allocations than others. Those that face larger cuts are likely to be net importers of 
water.  
In each year, moving from no trade to intra- and interregional trade together 
approximately halves the effect (between 47 and 55 per cent) of the reductions in 
water on the gross regional product (GRP) of the southern MDB. 
The potential increases in GRP of the southern MDB from water trade are greater in 
drier years such as 1999–2000 ($555 million in 1999–2000 dollars) (table 5.4), 
compared with years when water is more abundant, as in 2000–2001 ($201 million 
in 2000–01 dollars) (table 5.5).     




These estimates are the change in GRP of moving from no trade to both intra- and 
interregional trade when water availability is reduced from 1996–97 levels to 1999–
2000 or 2000–01 levels. It assumes that the structure of the economy is relatively 
constant between years. The dollar value of altering the trading regime is estimated 
by comparing the results of the different trade experiments. 
If variations in seasonal allocations are random (and do not exhibit long term 
patterns) irrigators are more likely to manage this short term risk through trade in 
seasonal allocations rather than trade in entitlements. Nevertheless, freeing up either 
or both kinds of trade will enable irrigators to better manage the variability 
associated with seasonal allocations. 
Although TERM-Water is not a dynamic model and therefore does not consider the 
flow on effects of changing levels of production, the year to year effects of 
expanding trade can be summed to provide a rough indication of the longer term 
implications of expanding trade to manage seasonal variability in allocations. For 
example, in the five years between 1997–98 and 2001–02, the GRP of the southern 
MDB would have been around $1.4 billion (in undiscounted 2001–02 dollars) or 
about one per cent higher if intra- and interregional trade had been allowed to re-
allocate water in response to variability in seasonal allocations (compared to no 
water trade). Given that variability in seasonal allocations is a common phenomena 
across the southern MDB, the long term benefits of expanding trade are likely to be 
larger than these estimates. 
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Table 5.2  GRP and GDP effects of 1997–98 water availability under different trade experimentsa 














trade only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only
 to allowing inter-
regional trade f 
Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra- and inter- 
regional trade g 
  % % %  %  %  % 
New South Wales           
Murrumbidgee –0.76  –0.56 –0.95  26.1  –69.0  –24.9 
Murray –4.18  –2.41  –1.92 42.3  20.4  54.1 
Victoria           
Mallee  –1.58 –0.80 –0.74  49.2  7.5  53.0 
Goulburn  –2.25 –1.71 –0.71  24.0  58.5  68.5 
Loddon  Campaspe –0.36 –0.25 –0.24  30.0  4.5  33.1 
Ovens  Murray  –0.08 –0.06 –0.10  29.7  –75.2  –23.2 
South Australia           
Murray Lands  –0.34  –0.34 –0.47  1.8  –40.1  –37.5 
Southern MDB  –1.48 –0.97 –0.77  34.4  20.3  47.8 
Australia  –0.09 –0.06 –0.05  38.0  17.3  48.7 
           
GRP and GDP levels h  $m $m $m  $m  $m  $m
Southern MDB  24 750  24 878  24 927  128  49  177 
Australia  561 686  561 884  561 940  198  56  254 
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as 
with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference between the first and second columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. g Proportional difference between the first 
and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. h In 1997–98 dollars. 
Source: TERM-Water estimates.  
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Table 5.3  GRP and GDP effects of 1998–99 water availability under different trade experimentsa 














trade only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only
 to allowing inter-
regional trade f 
Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra- and inter- 
regional trade g 
  % % %  %  %  % 
New South Wales           
Murrumbidgee –1.26  –0.81 –1.03  35.4  –27.0  17.9 
Murray –2.77  –1.70  –1.64 38.4  3.5  40.5 
Victoria           
Mallee  –1.78 –0.88 –0.74  50.4  15.6  58.2 
Goulburn  –2.86 –2.13 –0.70  25.7  67.1  75.6 
Loddon  Campaspe –0.39 –0.28 –0.24  30.0  13.0  39.1 
Ovens  Murray  –0.08 –0.06 –0.10  28.2  –72.5  –23.9 
South Australia           
Murray Lands  –0.34  –0.34 –0.46  –0.3  –37.3  –37.7 
Southern MDB  –1.53 –1.02 –0.74  33.5  26.7  51.2 
Australia  –0.10 –0.06 –0.05  37.1  23.9  52.1 
           
GRP and GDP levels h  $m $m $m  $m  $m  $m 
Southern MDB  26 104  26 239  26 311  136  72  207 
Australia  592 406  592 618  592 704  212  86  298 
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as 
with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference between the first and second columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. g Proportional difference between the first 
and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. h In 1998–99 dollars. 
Source: TERM-Water estimates. 
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Table 5.4  GRP and GDP effects of 1999–2000 water availability under different trade experimentsa 














trade only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only
 to allowing inter-
regional trade f 
Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra- and inter- 
regional trade g 
  % % %  %  %  % 
New South Wales           
Murrumbidgee  –2.1 –1.4 –1.9  36.3  –43.7  8.4 
Murray –9.6  –5.5  –4.1 42.7  24.8  56.9 
Victoria           
Mallee  –6.0 –2.4 –1.6  59.9  32.2  72.8 
Goulburn  –4.2 –3.1 –1.4  25.4  55.4  66.7 
Loddon  Campaspe –1.1 –0.7 –0.5  40.8  22.3  54.0 
Ovens  Murray  –0.1 –0.1 –0.2  51.7  –160.9  –26.2 
South Australia           
Murray Lands  –0.4  –0.4 –0.8  2.1  –116.5  –112.1 
Southern MDB  –3.5 –2.1 –1.6  40.7  23.9  54.9 
Australia  –0.2 –0.1 –0.1  45.4  20.1  56.4 
           
GRP and GDP levels h  $m $m $m  $m  $m  $m 
Southern MDB  27 599  28 011  28 154  412  143  555 
Australia  626 333  626 983  627 141  650  157  808 
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as 
with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference between the first and second columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. g Proportional difference between the first 
and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. h In 1999–2000 dollars. 
Source: TERM-Water estimates. 
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Table 5.5  GRP and GDP effects of 2000–01 water availability under different trade experimentsa 














trade only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only
 to allowing inter-
regional trade f 
Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra- and inter- 
regional trade g 
  % % %  %  %  % 
New South Wales           
Murrumbidgee –1.0  –0.6 –0.8  33.6  –32.6  11.9 
Murray –1.4  –1.0  –1.2 31.4  –22.5  15.9 
Victoria           
Mallee  –2.0 –1.0 –0.6  51.4  33.0  67.5 
Goulburn  –2.7 –2.0 –0.6  25.3  70.7  78.2 
Loddon  Campaspe –0.4 –0.3 –0.2  30.3  31.3  52.1 
Ovens  Murray  –0.1 –0.1 –0.1  25.0  –54.0  –15.6 
South Australia           
Murray Lands  –0.3  –0.3 –0.4  1.5  –17.2  –15.4 
Southern MDB  –1.3 –0.9 –0.6  32.0  30.9  53.0 
Australia  –0.1 –0.1  0.0  35.6  28.5  54.0 
           
GRP and GDP levels h  $m $m $m  $m  $m  $m 
Southern MDB  29 587  29 709  29 789  122  80  201 
Australia  671 460  671 652  671 751  192  99  291 
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as 
with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference between the first and second columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. g Proportional difference between the first 
and third columns, except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. h In 2000–01 dollars. 
Source: TERM-Water estimates. 
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Table 5.6  GRP and GDP effects of 2001–02 water availability under different trade experimentsa 














trade only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only
 to allowing inter-
regional trade f 
Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra- and inter- 
regional trade g 
  % % %  %  %  % 
New South Wales           
Murrumbidgee  –2.8 –1.5 –1.2  47.7  16.5  56.3 
Murray –2.0  –1.3  –1.5 32.5  –12.5  24.1 
Victoria           
Mallee  –1.4 –0.7 –0.7  49.8  –1.7  49.0 
Goulburn  –1.8 –1.3 –0.7  23.5  47.9  60.1 
Loddon  Campaspe –0.3 –0.2 –0.2  29.3  –3.0  27.2 
Ovens  Murray  –0.1 –0.1 –0.1  33.5  –64.8  –9.6 
South Australia           
Murray Lands  –0.3  –0.3 –0.5  4.0  –43.3  –37.6 
Southern MDB  –1.4 –0.9 –0.8  37.3  15.5  47.0 
Australia  –0.1 –0.1  0.0  41.2  12.7  48.7 
           
GRP and GDP levels h  $m $m $m  $m  $m  $m 
Southern MDB  31 467  31 638  31 682  171  44  215 
Australia  714 120  714 389  714 437  269  48  317 
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as 
with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference between the first and second columns except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. g Proportional difference between the first and 
third columns except the final two rows are differences in dollar amount. h In 2001–02 dollars. 
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A  Irrigation industry data 
Figure A.1  Major irrigation districts in Australia 
 
 
























Hectares of Irrigated Area 
per Statistical Local Area     




Table A.1  Net water consumption for selected industries, 1996–97a 
Sector  NSW–ACT   Vic  Qld  SA  WA  Tas   NT   Aust. 
 GL    GL  GL  GL  GL  GL   GL   GL 
Livestock, pasture, grains 
and other agriculture 
3 405  3 549  726  640  402  70  4  8 795 
Vegetables    194 108  122  65 104  41 0.2  635 
Sugar   0.4  –  1 176  –  60  –  –  1 236 
Fruit   279  172  91  115  41  2  4  704 
Grapevines   242  218  4  172  11  0.2  1  649 
Cotton    1  417 –  423  – – – –  1  841 
Rice   1 643  –  –  –  –  —  –  1 643 
Total for agriculture  7 181  4 047  2 542  992  619  113  9  15 503 
Total Australia  8 716  6 687  3 680  1 261  1 424  314  103  22 186 
a Net water consumption = mains water use + self-extracted water use – mains water supply. Excluding 
instream use. 
Source: ABS (2000). 
Table A.2  List of regions and their irrigation companies 




West Corurgan Irrigation 
Murray Irrigation Limited  Murray 
Western Murray Irrigation 
First Mildura Irrigation Trust 






Central Irrigation Trust 
Golden Heights Irrigation Trust 
Renmark Irrigation Trust 
Murray Lands 
Sunlands Irrigation Trust 
     




Table A.3 Irrigation  scheme  entitlements  in the southern Murray-Darling 
Basin, 2001–02 
Irrigation company  Entitlement
  ML 
New South Wales   
  Coleambally Irrigation  632 000
  Murray Irrigation Limited  1 450 000
  Murrumbidgee Irrigation  1 200 000
  Western Murray Irrigation  61 000
  West Corurgan Irrigation  78 000
Victoria 
  First Mildura Irrigation Trust  85 055
  Goulburn-Murray Water  1 600 000
  Sunraysia Rural Water Authority  301 273
South Australia 
  Central Irrigation Trust  120 000
  Renmark Irrigation Trust  49 000
Source: Hassall & Associates in association with Musgrave (2002). 
Table A.4  Ratios of gross trade in seasonal allocations to total 
allocations, and trade in entitlements to total allocations 
 2000–01  2001–02  2002–03
  % %  %
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area    
Ratio of trade in seasonal allocations to total allocations  18.9  14.2  17.3
Ratio of trade in entitlements to total allocations  0.3  0.6  0.6
Murray Irrigation district    
Ratio of trade in seasonal allocations to total allocations  14.2  6.9  28.6
Ratio of trade in entitlements to total allocations  0.3  0.3  1.4
Goulburn-Murray Water district    
Ratio of trade in seasonal allocations to total allocations  9.7  12.2  18.4
Ratio of trade in entitlements to total allocations  1.7  1.7  2.5
Aggregate    
Ratio of trade in seasonal allocations to total allocations  10.9  11.1  19.5
Ratio of trade in entitlements to total allocations  0.9  0.9  1.8
Data sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 April 2004; MI, pers. comm, 22 December 2003; MIA, 
pers. comm., 7 April 2004. 
     




Table A.5  Channel capacity constraints on the River Murray system 
 Daily  Monthly 
 ML/day  GL/month
Mitta Mitta — Dartmouth to Hume  10 000  304
Murray — Hume to Yarrawonga  25 000  761
Mulwala Canal  10 000  304
Yarrawonga Main Channel  3 106  95
Murray downstream of Yarrawonga:   
  (a) June to December (up to)  15 000  457
  (b) At other times  10 600  323
Murray upstream of Barmah  8 500  259
National Channel offtake  4 400  134
Edward/Gulpa offtakes:    
  (a) June to December  2 350  72
  (b) At other times  1 950  59
Edward escape:   
  (a) December to March  2 100  64
  (b) At other times  2 400  73
Wakool escape  600  18
Yallakool escape  70  2
Edward River downstream of Stevens Weir  2 900  88
Darling River at Weir 32  9 000  274
Lake Victoria inlet  9 000  274
Lake Victoria outlet  9 000  274
Goulburn River — release from Eildon  14 700  447
East Goulburn main offtake  2 600  79
Inlets to Waranga Basin  7 290  222
Outlets from Waranga Basin  6 000  183
Tumut River at Oddys Bridge  9 000  274
Tumut River at Tumut  9 300  283
Murrumbidgee River at Gundagai  3 200  974
Yanco Creek at offtake  1 400  43
Murrumbidgee River upstream of Balranald  10 000  304
Source: MDBC, pers. comm., 7 April 2004. 
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B Simulations 
The size of the economic effects of expanding trade in the southern Murray-Darling 
Basin (MDB) is estimated by conducting simulations with TERM-Water (see 
Wittwer 2003). These simulations portray the economy once all changes have 
occurred in response to a permanent reduction in water availability. This appendix 
contains an overview of the simulations reported in this paper. 
Experimental framework 
In the model, an industry in a region uses or consumes exactly what it has been 
allocated, by way of water. In the database, each industry in each region has water 
consumption, which is its initial ‘endowment’ of water. How the industry obtained 
this quantity of water — whether by entitlements or by trade in allocations — is not 
considered in the model. What is generated by the model are trades that are 
stimulated by cuts in water availability. A cut in water availability means an equal 
cut in consumption of the entity suffering the cut, unless there is trade. In the ‘no 
trade’ experiment, no further trade in water is permitted over and above that trade 
embedded in the database. 
Simulations are grouped in sets of three, with each set showing the effects of shocks 
under each of three possible water trading experiments: 
1.  no trade — no (further) trade permitted between industries within the same 
region or between regions (experiment A). Trade is assumed to have occurred 
among businesses within an industry before the shock, but these prior trades are 
not reported; 
2.  intra-regional trade only — trade permitted between industries in the same 
region, but not between regions (experiment B); and 
3.  intra- and interregional trade — trade permitted between industries in the same 
region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB (experiment C). 
Irrigation areas are defined in the model along statistical divisions. Trade within an 
irrigation area is possible among different irrigation activities.     




All simulations are comparative static, each comparing a snapshot of the economy 
without the reduction in water availability with a snapshot of the economy after all 
adjustments to the lower level of water availability have fed through the economy. 
Most simulations are long run, allowing capital, labour and land to be re-allocated 
to varying degrees in response to the modelled changes. Full employment is 
assumed. Long run simulations also assume that people do not change their 
residence, but travel to new jobs that might be created in another region. In the end, 
some might change their residence. The implications of this assumption are that: 
•  there is no constraint on the movement of labour and therefore labour does not 
constrain the expansion of more profitable uses of water 
•  regional gross domestic product is still an accurate measure of production in a 
region, but some workers might spend their incomes in their region of residence, 
thus adding to that region’s consumption and services activity. 
One set of simulations shows the effects in a short run economic environment of a 
reduction in water availability, with no mobility of capital between industries or 
regions.  
Overall gains from additional trade are indicated by differences between results 
from the intra- and interregional trade experiment and the no trade experiment.  
All of the reported simulations model the effects of either a 10, 20 or 30 per cent 
reduction in water availability to the southern MDB. In each simulation, the water is 
permanently removed for use by the agricultural industries and is not re-allocated to 
any other sector in the model. The water removed is not expliticly valued in the 
model. 
The 10 per cent reduction is used as a reference case for analysis of the sensitivity 
of the results to changes in the assumptions regarding key model parameters and the 
distribution of reductions in water availability. The reference case and its 
alternatives are designed to show how the effects of a proportional cut in water 
availability for each region of the southern MDB differ when no (further) trade, 
limited trade or full trade is allowed. Simulations underlying the sensitivity tests are 
designed to show: 
1.  how the effects in the reference case differ when the input substitutability of 
water in the rice industry is the same as that for all other (non-cattle) irrigation 
industries 
2.  how the effects in the reference case differ when the input substitutability of 
water in all irrigation industries increases     
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3.  how the effects the reference case differ when the same overall cut in water 
availability is not split equi-proportionally across each region of the southern 
MDB 
4.  how the effects in the reference case differ from the short run effects (when 
capital use is fixed). 
Simulation details 
Table B.1 lists and describes the simulations and indicates the sections and/or 
appendixes in which the results are presented. Each set of simulations is described 
in more detail in the next section. 
Table B.1  Simulations reported in this paper 
Simulation set  Description  Location of results
Proportional cut  
(10 per cent) in 
water availability —
long run (reference 
case) 
Under three trade experiments (no water trade, intra-regional 
trades only and intra- and interregional trades), impose a 10 
per cent reduction in initial water availability for each industry 
and region in the southern MDB with capital mobile. 
Section 4 and 
appendix D
Proportional cut  
(20 per cent) in 
water availability —
long run 
Under each of the three trade experiments, impose a 20 per 
cent reduction in initial water availability for each industry 
and region in the southern MDB with capital mobile. 
Section 4 and 
appendix D
Proportional cut  
(30 per cent) in 
water availability —
long run 
Under each of the three trade experiments, impose a 30 per 
cent reduction in initial water availability for each industry 
and region in the southern MDB with capital mobile. 





Under each of the three trade experiments, impose a 10 per 
cent reduction in initial water availability for each industry 
and region in the southern MDB with increased 
substitutability of water for other inputs in the rice industry 





Under each of the three trade experiments, impose a 10 per 
cent reduction in initial water availability for each industry 
and region in the southern MDB with increased 
substitutability of water for other inputs in all irrigation 
industries and with capital mobile. 
Appendix D
Differential cut in 
water availability 
Under each of the three trade experiments, impose a 10 per 
cent reduction in initial water availability for the entire 
southern MDB, but impose the reduction in different 
proportions for each region with capital mobile. 
Appendix D
Proportional cut in 
water availability — 
short run 
Under each of the three trade experiments, impose a 10 per 
cent reduction in initial water availability for each industry 
and region in the southern MDB with capital fixed. 
Appendix D
     




Proportional cut in water availability — long run 
The first set of simulations is the reference case and shows the effects of a 10 per 
cent reduction in water availability for each industry and region in the southern 
MDB under each of three water trading experiments: no trade, intra-regional trade 
only and intra- and interregional trade. 
Allowing for intra-regional trade means water use does not necessarily equate to 
pre-trade allocations as industries within a given region of the southern MDB buy 
and sell water. Water availability for each industry in each region is cut by 10 per 
cent. Industries in a region are free to trade water and adjust their use. As a result, 
water use by an industry may decline by more than 10 per cent, decline by less than 
10 per cent or even increase according to trade. 
With intra- and interregional trade possible, original water availability for each 
industry and region is reduced by 10 per cent. Irrigation industries are free to trade 
water with any other irrigation industry in the southern MDB. Depending on trade, 
total water use in some regions may decline by more than 10 per cent, decline by 
less than 10 per cent or even increase. 
The second and third sets of simulations calculate the (long run) effects of 
proportional cuts in water availability of 20 and 30 per cent respectively, for each 
industry and region in the southern MDB under each of the three trading 
experiments. 
SIGTOP sensitivity analysis 
SIGTOP is a parameter in the model that represents the input elasticity of irrigation 
water. It determines the extent to which changes in the relative price of water affect 
substitution between water and all other inputs (box 3.4).  
For all simulations, SIGTOP is assumed to be low, reflecting the importance of 
irrigation water in production. For simulations in the reference case SIGTOP is set 
at 0.05 for the meat and dairy cattle industries, to reflect somewhat higher 
opportunities for substituting other inputs for water (for example, substituting feed 
grains for irrigated pasture). SIGTOP is set at 0.01 for the rice industry, reflecting 
the importance of water in rice production. For all other irrigation industries, 
SIGTOP is set at 0.03. 
The fourth and fifth sets of simulations are used to examine the sensitivity of results 
in the reference case to the choice of SIGTOP value, and are based on uniform cuts 
to industry and region water availability in the southern MDB under each of the 
three trading regimes. In the first test, SIGTOP for the rice industry is increased to     
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0.03 to match that for other non-cattle industries, removing the large difference in 
water substitutability in rice relative to other industries. The second test is used for 
more general sensitivity testing for SIGTOP, which is increased to 0.10 for the 
cattle industries and 0.05 for all other irrigation industries. 
Table B.2 Assumed  values  for  SIGTOP 
 
Simulation set 




All other irrigation 
industries
Sensitivity testing — 
rice industry’s SIGTOP 
0.05 0.03  0.03
Sensitivity testing —  
all irrigation industries’ 
SIGTOPs 
0.10 0.05  0.05
All other simulations  0.05  0.01  0.03
Differential cut in water availability 
The sixth set of simulations shows the effects of a 10 per cent reduction in water 
availability to irrigators in the southern MDB, with the reduction not split equi-
proportionally across all regions. These simulations are used to test the sensitivity of 
the reference case results to the assumption of equi-proportional cuts in water 
availability. 
The changes in water availability for each region are given in table B.3. For each 
region, the reduction in availability is based on historical trends in allocations 
relative to entitlements (table 2.1). For each region, these reductions are spread 
proportionally across all irrigation industries. Water availability for each industry in 
the Murrumbidgee region, for example, is reduced by 20 per cent. In total, across 
the southern MDB, the reductions add up to 10 per cent, so as to match the equi-
proportional cut. 
Under the no trade regime, water use by each industry in each region is reduced. A 
25 per cent reduction in water availability for the Murray region in Victoria, for 
example, means each industry must use 25 per cent less water. This is an 
involuntary cut. 
With intra-regional trade only, total water use by each region is reduced by the 
required proportion to match the region’s total water availability. Given that 
industries in a region can now trade, water use for a particular industry may not 
decline by the same proportion as the reduction in water use for the region. 
Although total water use for the Murray region must decline by 25 per cent, for 
example, water use by some industries in that region may decline by more than     




25 per cent as they sell water. That is, the involuntary cuts are modified further by 
voluntary changes in consumption. 
With both intra- and interregional trade possible, the only constraint on water use is 
that the total for the southern MDB declines by 10 per cent — trade determines how 
the changed water availability translates into use by industries and regions. 
Although the water availability for each industry in the Murrumbidgee region 
declines by 20 per cent, for example, water use for the entire region may decline by 
more than 20 per cent if enough industries sell their smaller quantity of water to 
industries in other regions. 
Table B.3  Changes in regional water availability 
Region  Change in water availability  Change in water availability
 % ML
New South Wales   
Murrumbidgee –20  –291  368
Murray –25  –376  065
Victoria   
Mallee 10  59  402
Goulburn 10  89  062
Loddon Campaspe  10  19 191
Ovens Murray  10  7 522
South Australia   
Murray Lands  –3  –9 124
Southern MDB  –10 –501  381
Source: Productivity Commission estimates. 
Short run cuts in water availability 
In short run simulations, labour is less mobile between industries and regions than 
in the long run and capital use is fixed in each industry and region. 
Additional assumption — no water saving technical change 
In the long run, irrigation industries may undergo water saving technical change as 
water availability to the southern MDB is reduced and industries find new ways to 
reduce water requirements per unit of output. Such technical change is not included.     
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Table B.4  Regions modelled in TERM-Water 
Southern MDB regions  Other MDB regions  Other regions 
Murrumbidgee, New South Wales  Northern New South Wales   Rest of New South Wales 
Murray, New South Wales  North west New South Wales  Rest of Victoria 
Mallee, Victoria  Far west New South Wales  Rest of Queensland 
Loddon Campaspe, Victoria  Darling Downs Queensland  Rest of South Australia 
Goulburn, Victoria  South west Queensland  Western Australia 
Ovens Murray, Victoria    Tasmania 
Murray Lands, South Australia    Northern Territory 
    Australian Capital Territory
Source: TERM-Water database. 
Table B.5  Industries and broad sectors modelled in TERM-Water 
Industrya Broad  sector  Industry Broad  sector 
Sheep  Primary  Beef products  Food processing 
Barley  Primary  Other meat products  Food processing 
Wheat  Primary  Dairy products  Food processing 
Other broadacre  Primary  Fruit processing  Food processing 
Beef cattle  Primary  Vegetable processing  Food processing 
Dairy cattle  Primary  Flour and cereals  Food processing 
Pigs and poultry  Primary  Sugar refining  Food processing 
Rice  Primary Seafood  Food  processing 
Cotton  Primary Premium  wine  Food  processing 
Citrus  Primary  Bulk wine  Food processing 
Apples and pears  Primary  Other food products  Food processing 
Stone fruits  Primary  Woven fibre manufacturing  Manufacturing 
Other fruit and nuts  Primary Other  manufacturing  Manufacturing 
Premium dry land grapes  Primary  Water, sewerage and 
drainage services 
Services 
Premium irrigated grapes  Primary Utilities  Services 
Other grapes (table)  Primary Construction  Services 
Sugarcane Primary  Trade  Services 
Irrigated pasture  Primary Transport  Services 
Vegetables  Primary Communication  services  Services 
Other crops  Primary Banking,  financial  services 
and insurance 
Services 
Agricultural services  Primary  Ownership of dwellings  Services 
Forestry Primary  Other  business  services  Services 
Fishing Primary  Government,  defence, 
education and health 
Services 
Mining Primary  Other  services  Services 
a Industries using irrigation water are shown in bold. 
Source: TERM-Water database.     




C  Examples of regulatory arrangements 
affecting water trade 
This appendix provides examples of the types of regulatory arrangements that can 
apply to the trading of seasonal allocations and water entitlements within, and 
between, irrigation districts. Because the Goulburn-Murray region comprises a 
number of subdistricts, a matrix showing possible trade between subdistricts is 
included. 
Regulatory arrangements in selected districts 
This section provides examples of regulatory arrangements affecting trade in the 
Murray and Lower Darling district, the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area (MIA), and 
the Goulburn and Victorian Murray districts. 
Table C.1  Examples of NSW government regulatory arrangements 
affecting water trading in the Murray and Lower Darling district 
Seasonal allocation trades  Water entitlement trades 
Intra-district  Inter-districta Intra-district Inter-districta 




• Transfers can only 
occur downstream 
through the Barmah 
Choke if the water 
can be supplied from 
Lake Victoria during 
peak demand 
• Trade is prohibited 
from SA to NSW 
downstream of the 
Barmah Choke 
• Trade may be 
restricted between 
the Murray and 
Murrumbidgee 
valleys if water 
availability is low 




• No downstream 




general to high 
security cannot be 
traded for 5 years  
 
Interstate trades 
• Only high security 
water may be traded  
• Trade restricted to 
area from Nyah to 
SA barrages 
a Trades will only be approved where the ability to supply other users is not significantly diminished and there 
are no adverse environmental impacts. 
Source: DIPNR 2003.     




Table C.2  Examples of utility-specific arrangements affecting water 
trading in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area 
Seasonal allocation trades  Water entitlement trades 
Intra-district  Inter-districta Intra-district Inter-districta 
• Early close off dates 
for intention to trade 
high security water 
(early August) b 
• Loss of ‘bonus’ 
access (eg, to 
carryover, off-
allocation water etc) 
if there is net trade 
out of general 
security water (Valley 
rule) c 
• Early closing date for 
trade. Usually end of 
February d  
• Special regulatory 
arrangements within 










• Once approved for 
transfer out of the 
Company licence 
deliverability is a 
matter for DIPNR 
and other agencies 
involved 
• Transfers out of 
licence are subject to 
a requirement to 
retain about 25% on 
farm e 
• All applications 
assessed for 3rd party 
impacts, especially  
environmental and 
deliverability impacts 
• High security — can 
trade up to 3 ML/ha if 
hi-tech direct to plant 
system is installed 
(without restriction)  
• High security must 
keep the greater of 
6ML/ha or 25% of 
farm entitlement e 
• General security —  
must retain 25% of 
entitlement on farm e 
• Quantitative limit (4 
ML/ha) on transfer of 
residential supplies e 




problems, and certain 
types of allocation 
(drainage re-use, “off-
allocation”, and urban 
water) 
• Increased analysis 




impacts (for trades 
in and out) 
• High security — net 
export of up to 1% 
of high security 
entitlement plus 3 
ML/ha under hi-tech 
system f 
• Annual limit on net 
trade out of General 
security licences 
equal to 0.5% of 
total MIA entitlement 
(about 4600 ML) f 
a Requirements are in addition to those applying within the district. b Under review with likelihood that early 
statement of trade intent will apply to all types of security. c Under review with likelihood that losses will relate 
only to water acquired by the company. d Under review with likelihood that intra-valley trade will be extended 
to season end. e Under review with likelihood that all retention limits will be set at 20 per cent of entitlement (to 
be consistent with the average cap relative to entitlement in the Valley and environmental requirements). 
f Under review with likelihood that limits triggering reviews of socio-economic impacts will be changed. 
Source: MIA, pers. comm., 21 April 2004.     




Table C.3  Examples of Victorian Government regulatory arrangements 
affecting trades in the Goulburn and Victorian Murray districts 
Seasonal allocation trades  Water entitlement trades 
Intra-district  Inter-districta Intra-district Inter-districta 
• Only first 30 per cent 
of ‘sales’ water can 
be traded which 
forfeits access to all 
‘sales’ water above 
30 per cent 






• GMW tends to 
replicate the 
regulation for water 
entitlements in its 
rules for trades in 
seasonal allocations 
• Transfers  to NSW 
not allowed after 
February each year 
• Prescribes a 
maximum water 
entitlement to be 
attached to each 
land holding 
• Imposes a $275 fee 
on all transfers 
• Prevents trade 
between prescribed 
subdistricts 
• Prevents net exports 
from the ‘Murray 
system’ to the 
‘Goulburn system’, 
and from the 
‘Goulburn system’ to 
the ‘Campaspe’ 
system’  
• Prescribes a two per 
cent cap on net 
exports from most 
subdistricts 
• Only annual and 
permanent transfers 
allowed 
a Requirements are in addition to those applying within the district. Also, trades will only be approved where 
the ability to supply other users is not significantly diminished and there are no adverse environmental 
impacts. 
Source: Water (Permanent Transfer of Water Rights) Regulations 2001 (Victoria). 
Water trading across subdistricts in the Goulburn-Murray 
Table C.4 below shows which irrigation subdistricts can trade seasonal allocations 
and entitlements with other subdistricts in the GMW district, and at what exchange 
rates (as at April 2004). Irrigators in the Greater Goulburn (subdistrict 1A), for 
example, can sell water to and purchase water from most other subdistricts. In some 
cases, however, trade may be allowed in only one direction. For example, irrigators 
in the Greater Goulburn (subdistrict 1A) can purchase water from the 
Nyah-to-South Australia high impact subdistrict (subdistrict 8H) but not sell water 
to that subdistrict (because of potential environmental impacts). Limited trade in 
subdistricts 9A, 9B, 10A and 10B reflect their location above the Barmah Choke 
which restricts the flow of water. 
Table C.4 also illustrates that exchange rates can be asymmetrical. An irrigator in 
the Murray Irrigation district (subdistrict 10B), for example, who purchases 
1 megalitre from an irrigator in the Hume-to-Barmah (New South Wales) subdistrict 
(10A), will only receive 0.85 megalitres, but if they were to sell 1 megalitre to that 
subdistrict, then the recipient would receive 1 megalitre.  
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Table C.4  Goulburn Murray-Water exchange rate trade matrix for seasonal allocation and entitlement tradesa 
Buyer 
Ref.  Subdistrict  1A 1B 1C 1D 1E  3 4A 5A  5B  6  7  8H 8L4 8L3 8L2 8L1  9A 9B 10A  10B 
1A  Greater  Goulburn  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt  nt  nt 
1B  Boort  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt  nt  nt 
1C  Pyramid–Boort  1 1 1 1 1 * * *  nt * *  nt * * * *  nt  nt  nt  nt 
1D  Rochester  1 1 1 1 1 * * *  nt * *  nt * * * *  nt  nt  nt  nt 
1E  Central  Goulburn  1 1 1 1 1 * * *  nt * *  nt * * * *  nt  nt  nt  nt 
3 Lower  Goulburn  1 1 * * * 1 1 1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt  nt  nt 
4A  Campaspe  1 1 * * * 1 1  nt  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt  nt  nt 
5A  Loddon  1 1 * * * 1  nt 1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt  nt  nt 
5B Bullarook  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt 1  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt 
6 Hume  to  Barmah  1 1 * * * 1 1 1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
7 Barmah  to  Nyah  1 1 * * * 1 1 1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
8H  Nyah to SA Border HIZ  1  1  *  *  *  1  1  1  nt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
8L4  Nyah to SA Border LIZ4  1  1  *  *  *  1  1  1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
8L3  Nyah to SA Border LIZ3  1  1  *  *  *  1  1  1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
8L2  Nyah to SA Border LIZ2  1  1  *  *  *  1  1  1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
8L1  Nyah to SA Border LIZ1  1  1  *  *  *  1  1  1  nt 1 1  nt 1 1 1 1  nt  nt 1  0.85 
9A Ovens  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt 1  1  nt  nt 
9B King  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt 1  1  nt  nt 








10B  Murray Irrigation Limited  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt 1  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt  nt 1  1 
a 1 means trade may be permitted at an exchange rate of 1, 0.85 means trade may be permitted but at an exchange rate of 0.85, nt means no trade permitted, * means 
asymmetries in trading rules (for example, rules whereby one subdistrict can buy from/sell to another subdistrict, but the latter subdistrict is not permitted to sell to/buy from the 
former). Asymmetries affecting subdistricts 1B, 1C, 1D and 1E occur because they have reached their 2 per cent cap on net exports for 2004 and only imports are allowed. Note that 
additional regulations can apply and these need to be considered on application (see Watermove 2004).  
Source: Watermove 2004.     





D  Data tables and simulation results 
Table D.1  Industry contributions to gross regional product 







 % % % %  %  %  %
Broad sectors          
Primary  17.30 19.09 28.08 15.29  7.20 6.44  27.07
Food  processing  15.32 12.02 18.62 18.23  8.76  13.06  24.68
Manufacturing 7.15  10.01  3.78 11.24  18.09  16.97  4.71
Services 60.23  58.87  49.51 55.24  65.95  63.54  43.54
Total  100 100 100 100  100  100  100
Primary          
Sheep  2.20 2.26 1.46 1.20  1.30  0.40  1.61
Barley  0.66 0.61 2.36 0.08  0.18  –  1.52
Wheat  2.92 2.24 3.70 0.33  0.55  0.06  1.85
Other broadacre  1.71  2.22 0.24 0.16  0.10  0.04  0.20
Beef cattle  0.83  0.99  0.54 1.53  0.29  1.44  0.44
Dairy  cattle  0.11 1.21 2.12 5.08  0.43  1.49  1.48
Pigs and poultry  0.32  1.29  0.76  0.52  1.07  0.13  1.22
Rice  1.74 2.91 0.01 0.03  –  –  –
Cotton  – – – –  –  –  –
Citrus  1.32 0.85 1.78 0.07  –  –  3.90
Apples and pears  0.53  0.07 –  2.15  0.24  0.29  0.13
Stone  fruits  0.45 0.05 0.61 0.87  –  0.13  2.23
Other fruit and 
nuts 
0.50 0.58 3.26 0.05  –  0.11  2.66
Premium dryland 
grapes 
– – –  0.04  0.01  0.10  –
Premium irrigated 
grapes 
0.82 0.44 2.64 0.01  –  0.09  3.57
Multi-grape  – 0.54 3.66 0.01  –  –  0.22
Sugarcane  – – – –  –  –  –
Irrigated pasture  0.09  0.17 0.16 0.37  0.13  0.13  0.10
Vegetables  0.53 0.51 1.29 0.43  0.18  –  2.52
Other crops  0.95  0.61  1.18 0.40  0.26  0.69  0.71
Agricultural 
services 
1.02 1.10 1.58 0.93  0.36  0.37  1.50
Forestry 0.33  0.33  0.16 0.19  0.14  0.53  0.04
Fishing  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.25  0.02  0.09  0.44
Mining  0.25 0.10 0.54 0.61  1.93  0.35  0.73
(Continued next page)     




Table D.1  (continued) 
 







 % % % %  %  %  %
Food processing          
Beef products  2.35  0.71 0.20 0.54  1.96  0.78  1.56
Other meat 
products 
2.25 0.69 0.19 0.50  1.76  0.73  1.31
Dairy  products  0.67 1.25 1.66 7.77  1.30  1.04  2.57
Fruit processing  0.85  0.22 1.47 2.73  0.04  0.14  0.44
Vegetable 
processing 
0.89 0.29 1.50 3.10  0.22  0.25  0.45
Flour, cereals  2.96  4.55  –  0.43  0.39  3.78  0.25
Sugar  refining  0.39 0.68 0.31 0.29  0.45  0.36  0.22
Seafood 0.20  0.45  0.21  0.29 0.38  0.50 0.47
Premium  wine  1.99 1.04 5.69 0.27  0.05  0.93  8.13
Bulk wine  0.68  0.51  3.72  –  –  –  6.47
Other food 
products 
2.09 1.64 3.68 2.32  2.21  4.56  2.80
Manufacturing          
Fibre, woven  0.64  0.50  –  0.36  1.00  3.80  –
Other 
manufacturing 
6.51 9.51 3.78  10.88 17.09  13.17  4.71
Services          
Water drains  1.51  1.87  2.68 2.22  1.13  1.29  2.06
Utilities 1.41  1.05  0.49 0.84  1.16  3.43  0.85
Construction  5.20 5.26 3.93 5.11  6.09  5.29  3.76
Trade  15.84 17.80 15.98 15.48  16.03  15.28  14.37
Transport  5.20 4.68 3.78 4.86  6.18  3.67  3.60
Communication 
services 




2.46 2.54 2.00 2.31  3.78  2.32  1.71
Owner  dwelling  6.00 6.07 4.25 4.61  5.42  4.64  3.88
Business 
services 




11.34 9.55 8.18  10.24 11.31  16.36  6.69
Other services  2.71  2.68 2.67 3.17  4.78  3.89  2.84
Source: TERM-Water database. 
     





Table D.2  Industry contributions to regional water use in the southern 
Murray-Darling Basin 







  % % % %  %  %  %  %
Sheep 10.0  7.0  10.9  3.0  20.8  –  2.2  7.8
Other 
broadacre 
14.4  12.8 0.5 1.2  9.1  0.1  0.5  8.7
Beef cattle  5.7  4.3  5.1 13.5  10.8  12.1  1.8  6.6
Dairy  cattle  0.8  7.4 39.3 63.4  22.9  62.3  19.8  21.4
Rice  49.0  58.1 0.1 0.7  –  –  –  31.8
Citrus  2.2 1.0 3.0 0.2  –  –  13.5  2.1
Apples and 
pears 
0.9 0.1  – 5.2  2.4  3.7  0.5  1.4
Stone  fruits  0.8 0.1 1.0 2.1  –  1.6  7.8  1.2
Other fruit 
and nuts 












– 1.4  15.1 0.2  –  –  2.0  2.4
Irrigated 
pasture 
0.7 1.1 2.9 4.6  7.1  5.4  1.4  2.1
Vegetables 2.5  1.5  3.1 1.9  2.2  –  7.2  2.4
Other crops  8.0  3.5  2.6 3.1  23.8  1.8  1.6  5.3
Total  100 100 100 100  100  100  100  100
Source: TERM-Water database. 
Table D.3  Price rises in southern Murray-Darling Basin regions 
After a 10 per cent reduction in water availability 
  Intra-regional trade only  Intra- and interregional trade
 $/ML  $/ML
New South Wales   
Murrumbidgee   31  41
Murray   30  41
Victoria    
Mallee 74  41
Goulburn 70  41
Loddon Campaspe  90  41
Ovens Murray  128  41
South Australia    
Murray Lands  153  41
Source: TERM-Water simulations.  
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Table D.4  Change in industry output under different experiments 
After 10 per cent reduction in water availability. Intra- and interregional trade (intra-regional trade only) 
 Murrumbidgee  Murray  Mallee  Goulburn 
Loddon 
Campaspe  Ovens Murray  Murray Lands Southern MDB
 % % % % % % %  %
Broad sectors           
Primary  –3.15 (–2.24)  –4.11 (–2.84)  –0.8 (–1.38)  –1.38 (–3.12)  –1.06 (–1.81)  –0.42 (–1.63)  –0.52 (–2.33)  –1.91 (–2.29) 
Food processing  –0.07 (–0.13)  –0.11 (–0.14)  –0.3 (–0.58)  –0.62 (–1.38)  –0.31 (–0.53)  –0.2 (–0.36)  –0.44 (–1.2)  –0.32 (–0.69) 
Manufacturing  0.07 (0.07)  0.02 (0.04)  0.02 (0.02)  0.03 (0.03)  0.02 (0.02)  0.03 (0.04)  0.02 (–0.03)  0.03 (0.03) 
Services  –0.48 (–0.35)  –0.68 (–0.49)  –0.22 (–0.38)  –0.18 (–0.41)  –0.05 (–0.09)  –0.02 (–0.07)  –0.15 (–0.55)  –0.27 (–0.32) 
Primary           
Sheep  –2.09 (–1.50)  –2 (–1.38)  –2.5 (–4.62) –0.51  (–1.21) –1.07  (–1.88)  0.1  (0.11)  –0.21 (–0.99)  –1.48 (–1.72) 
Barley  0.11 (0.09)  0.11 (0.09)  0.05 (0.06)  0 (–0.03)  0.01 (0)  0 (0)  0.02 (0.06)  0.06 (0.06) 
Wheat  0.12 (0.11)  0.13 (0.11)  0.06 (0.09)  0.01 (–0.01)  0.04 (0.05)  0.04 (0.06)  0.05 (0.07)  0.09 (0.09) 
Other broadacre  –2.70 (–1.92)  –2.55 (–1.73)  0.05 (–0.49)  –0.95 (–2.99)  –5.86 (–11.05)  0.55 (0.26)  0.2 (–0.98)  –2.42 (–1.99) 
Beef cattle  –3.20 (–2.16)  –2.84 (–1.82)  –3.13 (–5.77)  –2.17 (–4.96)  –2.79 (–4.82)  –0.14 (–0.81)  –0.71 (–3.13)  –2.14 (–3.3) 
Dairy cattle  –3.89 (–1.82)  –4.49 (–2.14)  –7.6 (–13.89)  –3.24 (–7.23) –4.43  (–7.35) –1.56  (–5.59)  –2.99 (–12.71)  –3.79 (–7.78) 
Pigs and poultry  0.10 (0.07)  0.09 (0.06)  0.02 (0)  0.03 (0.05)  –0.02 (–0.04)  0 (–0.01)  0 (0.03)  0.03 (0.02) 
Rice  –21.64 (–16.6)  –19.5 (–14.2)  –0.63 (–16.62)  1.78 (–20.28)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  –20.26 (–15.34) 
Citrus  –0.52 (–0.15)  –0.49 (–0.12)  –0.32 (–0.57)  –0.38 (–0.89)  0 (0)  0 (0)  –0.6 (–2.56)  –0.5 (–1.1) 
Apples and pears  –0.5 (–0.18)  –0.48 (–0.15)  0 (0)  –0.37 (–0.87)  –0.51 (–0.84)  –0.36 (–1.3)  –0.56 (–2.38)  –0.4 (–0.8) 
Stone fruits  –0.44 (0.06)  –0.42 (0.11)  –0.25 (–0.3)  –0.31 (–0.61)  0 (0)  –0.29 (–1.06)  –0.5 (–2.16)  –0.39 (–0.99) 
Other fruit and 
nuts 
–0.54 (–0.2)  –0.5 (–0.14)  –0.34 (–0.57)  –0.4 (–0.88)  0 (0)  –0.37 (–1.31)  –0.6 (–2.46)  –0.45 (–1.02) 
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Table D.4  (continued) 
 Murrumbidgee  Murray  Mallee  Goulburn 
Loddon 
Campaspe  Ovens Murray  Murray Lands Southern MDB
 % % % % % % %  %
Premium dryland 
grapes 
0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  –3.2 (–7.15)  –10.8 (–19.5)  –1.5 (–4.65)  0 (0)  –2.85 (–6.7) 
Premium 
irrigated grapes 
–1.07 (1.07)  –0.33 (1.71)  –0.02 (0.5)  –9.71 (–22.56)  0 (0)  –2.96 (–10.97)  –0.79 (–4.73)  –0.57 (–1.35) 
Multi-grape  0 (0)  –1.4 (–0.72)  –1.05 (–1.93)  –11.3 (–26.76)  0 (0)  0 (0)  –1.85 (–7.64)  –1.16 (–2.02) 
Irrigated pasture  –3.33 (–1.85)  –3.72 (–1.99)  –6.21 (–11.42)  –2.72 (–6.19)  –3.49 (–5.91)  –1.25 (–4.57)  –2.59 (–10.96)  –3.21 (–5.81) 
Vegetables  –1.98 (–1.35)  –1.79 (–1.15)  –0.59 (–1.09)  –0.9 (–2.06)  –0.71 (–1.21)  0 (0)  –0.48 (–2.04)  –0.95 (–1.59) 
Other crops  –4 (–2.82)  –3.77 (–2.56)  –0.41 (–0.88)  –1.68 (–3.92)  –7.57 (–13.32)  0.12 (–0.04)  –0.27 (–1.52)  –2.33 (–2.73) 
Agricultural 
services 
–0.36 (–0.37)  –0.4 (–0.45)  –0.33 (–0.51)  –0.36 (–0.64)  –0.37 (–0.6)  –0.17 (–0.33)  –0.29 (–0.66)  –0.35 (–0.52) 
Forestry  0.12 (0.11)  0.11 (0.08)  –0.04 (–0.1)  –0.06 (–0.18)  –0.01 (–0.04)  0.03 (0.03)  0.01 (–0.03)  0.04 (0.01) 
Fishing  0.18 (0.15)  0.19 (0.16)  0.07 (0.1)  0.1 (0.18)  0.04 (0.06)  0.04 (0.05)  0.01 (0.04)  0.06 (0.12) 
Mining  0.38 (0.34)  0.47 (0.4)  0.21 (0.29)  0.2 (0.32)  0.13 (0.17)  0.12 (0.16)  0.17 (0.29)  0.18 (0.24) 
Food processing           
Beef products  –0.55 (–0.55)  –0.63 (–0.52) –0.69  (–1.26) –0.45  (–0.98) –0.34  (–0.57) –0.14 (–0.33)  –0.24 (–0.49)  –0.43 (–0.59) 
Other meat 
products 
0 (0.01)  –0.05 (–0.03)  –0.16 (–0.3)  –0.02 (–0.05)  –0.07 (–0.11)  0 (0.01)  –0.01 (–0.02)  –0.03 (–0.04) 
Dairy products  –0.43 (–0.76)  –1.48 (–1.26)  –2.64 (–4.98)  –1.4 (–3.09) –1.05  (–1.91) –0.71  (–2.05)  –1.21 (–4.46)  –1.38 (–2.97) 
Fruit processing  0.17 (0.11)  0.14 (0.09)  0.02 (0.01)  0.01 (0.04)  –0.01 (–0.03)  –0.04 (–0.09)  –0.05 (–0.19)  0.04 (0.04) 
Vegetable 
processing 
0.24 (0.17)  0.12 (0.09)  0.13 (0.14)  0.1 (0.15)  –0.35 (–0.47)  –0.08 (–0.06)  0.07 (0.04)  0.11 (0.13) 
Flour, cereals  0.04 (0)  0.05 (0.01)  0 (0)  –0.29 (–0.48)  –0.34 (–0.37)  –0.21 (–0.17)  –0.26 (–0.28)  –0.05 (–0.07) 
Sugar refining  0.14 (0.1)  0.17 (0.14)  0.03 (0.05)  0.01 (0.02)  –0.02 (–0.03)  –0.02 (–0.03)  –0.02 (–0.02)  0.05 (0.04) 
Seafood  0.18 (0.13)  0.17 (0.14)  0.04 (0.05)  0.04 (0.08)  –0.07 (–0.12)  –0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.08)  0.05 (0.05) 
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Table D.4  (continued) 
 Murrumbidgee  Murray  Mallee  Goulburn 
Loddon 
Campaspe  Ovens Murray  Murray Lands Southern MDB
 % % % % % % %  %
Premium wine  –0.18 (–0.42)  –0.07 (–0.44)  –0.23 (–0.54)  –0.54 (–1.1)  –0.78 (–1.52)  –0.58 (–1.4)  –0.39 (–1.21)  –0.29 (–0.8) 
Bulk wine  –0.11 (0.07)  0.05 (0.05)  –0.1 (–0.08)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  –0.29 (–0.98)  –0.18 (–0.47) 
Other food 
products 
0.14 (0.12)  –0.03 (–0.01)  –0.14 (–0.2)  –0.38 (–0.88)  –0.18 (–0.32)  –0.06 (–0.13)  –0.95 (–0.84)  –0.2 (–0.33) 
Manufacturing           
Fibre, woven  –0.26 (–0.17)  –0.16 (–0.09)  0 (0)  0 (–0.02)  –0.15 (–0.26)  0 (0.04)  0 (0)  –0.08 (–0.07) 
Other 
manufacturing 
0.09 (0.09)  0.03 (0.05)  0.02 (0.02)  0.03 (0.03)  0.03 (0.03)  0.04 (0.04)  0.02 (–0.03)  0.04 (0.04) 
Services           
Water drains  –1.03 (–0.79)  –1.53 (–1.13)  –0.28 (–0.35)  –0.2 (–0.37) –0.11  (–0.15) –0.09  (–0.16)  –0.2 (–0.35)  –0.51 (–0.5) 
Utilities  –0.27 (–0.2)  –0.49 (–0.33)  –0.3 (–0.54)  –0.24 (–0.54) –0.05  (–0.1)  –0.01 (–0.03)  –0.16 (–0.63) –0.15  (–0.21) 
Construction  –0.5 (–0.39)  –0.7 (–0.59)  –0.26 (–0.44)  –0.29 (–0.55)  –0.09 (–0.12)  –0.13 (–0.16)  –0.13 (–0.44)  –0.32 (–0.38) 
Trade  –0.67 (–0.49)  –0.76 (–0.55)  –0.28 (–0.5) –0.23  (–0.54) –0.08  (–0.14) –0.03 (–0.11)  –0.2 (–0.69)  –0.35 (–0.43) 
Transport  –0.77 (–0.57)  –1.25 (–0.89)  –0.35 (–0.64)  –0.27 (–0.61)  –0.06 (–0.12)  –0.08 (–0.22)  –0.25 (–0.89)  –0.45 (–0.52) 
Communication 
services 




–0.52 (–0.37)  –0.7 (–0.48)  –0.22 (–0.4)  –0.2 (–0.47)  –0.06 (–0.11)  –0.01 (–0.08)  –0.13 (–0.57)  –0.28 (–0.33) 
Owner dwelling  –0.82 (–0.58)  –1.15 (–0.77)  –0.33 (–0.61)  –0.3 (–0.72) –0.09  (–0.16) –0.02  (–0.13)  –0.24 (–1.04)  –0.49 (–0.56) 
Business 
services 




–0.05 (–0.03)  –0.08 (–0.05)  –0.04 (–0.08)  –0.03 (–0.07)  0 (0)  0.01 (0)  –0.02 (–0.11)  –0.03 (–0.04) 
Other services  –0.22 (–0.16)  –0.33 (–0.22)  –0.1 (–0.18)  –0.1 (–0.22)  –0.03 (–0.05)  –0.01 (–0.04)  –0.07 (–0.27)  –0.12 (–0.15) 
Source: TERM-Water simulations.     





Table D.5  Decomposition of GRP impact by broad sector 
After a 10 per cent reduction in water availability 






Manufacturing  Services Water  sales
  % % % %  %
Intra- and interregional trade 
New South Wales      
Murrumbidgee   79.9  0.7  –0.4  41.1  –21.2
Murray   80.8  0.7  –0.1  40.2  –21.5
Victoria      
Mallee 63.5  7.7  –0.1  29.1  –0.2
Goulburn  56.5 13.9 –0.6 30.2  –0.1
Loddon 
Campaspe 
59.4 10.5 –2.1 32.2  0.0
Ovens  Murray  49.5 26.1 –5.9 30.3  0.0
South Australia      
Murray  Lands  54.6 21.1 –0.2 24.6  –0.1
Southern MDB   72.2 5.3  –0.4  36.5  –13.5
      
Intra-regional trade only 
New South Wales      
Murrumbidgee   73.3  1.7  –0.6  38.4  –12.8
Murray   72.7  1.2  –0.3  37.1  –10.7
Victoria      
Mallee 66.5  9.0  –0.1  31.5  –6.9
Goulburn  57.0 13.8 –0.2 30.9  –1.6
Loddon 
Campaspe 
59.9 10.6 –1.1 33.4  –2.8
Ovens  Murray  59.0 14.9 –2.4 29.7  –1.2
South Australia      
Murray  Lands  63.4 14.9  0.1 23.7  –2.0
Southern MDB  65.2 8.7  –0.3  32.6 –6.1
Source: TERM-Water simulations.     




Table D.6  GRP and GDP effects of a non-proportional reduction in water 
availability under different trade experimentsa 
 









Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra-regional trade 
only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only 
to allowing 
interregional trade f
 %  %  %  %  %
New South Wales        
Murrumbidgee –2.93  –1.54 –0.99  47  36
 (–1.29)  (–0.66)  (–0.87)  (49)  (–32)
Murray –4.42  –2.62  –1.41  41  46
 (–1.52)  (–0.90)  (–1.21)  (41)  (–35)
Victoria        
Mallee 0.79  0.61  –0.16  –23  –127
 (–1.39)  (–0.71)  (–0.41)  (49)  (42)
Goulburn 0.61  0.59  –0.20  –2  –134
 (–1.07)  (–0.90)  (–0.39)  (16)  (56)
0.18 0.18  –0.07  0  –139 Loddon 
Campaspe  (–0.30) (–0.22)  (–0.13)  (25)  (42)
Ovens Murray  0.07  0.09  –0.03  25  –130
 (–0.24)  (–0.19)  (–0.06)  (22)  (70)
South Australia        
Murray Lands  –0.29  –0.31  –0.29  –8  6
 (–1.50)  (–1.18)  (–0.30)  (21)  (75)
Southern MDB  –0.95 –0.45  –0.48  52  –6
 (–1.04)  (–0.67)  (–0.52)  (35)  (23)
Australia  –0.014 –0.009  –0.003  38  65
 (–0.008)  (–0.006)  (–0.004)  (31)  (22)
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. The non-
proportion reduction in water availability involved the same volume of water (500 GL) as the uniform 10 per 
cent reduction experiment, but was allocated as: Murrumbidgee –20 per cent; Murray –25 per cent; northern 
Victorian regions +10 per cent; Murray Lands –3 per cent. Figures in parentheses are results for the reference 
case. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or between regions. c Trade 
permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions.  d  Trade permitted between 
industries in the same region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference 
between the first and second columns. f Proportional difference between the second and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations.     





Table D.7  GRP and GDP effects of increased SIGTOP (rice industry) under 
different trade experimentsa 
 









Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra-regional trade 
only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only 
to allowing 
interregional trade f
 %  %  %  %  %
New South Wales          
Murrumbidgee  –1.26  –0.60  –0.81 52 –35
 (–1.29)  (–0.66)  (–0.87)  (49)  (–32)
Murray  –1.47  –0.81  –1.12 45 –38
 (–1.52)  (–0.90)  (–1.21)  (41)  (–35)
Victoria        
Mallee –1.39  –0.71  –0.39  49  45
 (–1.39)  (–0.71)  (–0.41)  (49)  (42)
Goulburn –1.07  –0.90  –0.38  16  58
 (–1.07)  (–0.90)  (–0.39)  (16)  (56)
–0.30 –0.22  –0.12  25  45 Loddon 
Campaspe  (–0.30) (–0.22)  (–0.13)  (25)  (42)
Ovens Murray  –0.24  –0.19  –0.05  22  72
 (–0.24)  (–0.19)  (–0.06)  (22)  (70)
South Australia        
Murray Lands  –1.50  –1.18  –0.28  21  76
 (–1.50)  (–1.18)  (–0.30)  (21)  (75)
Southern MDB  –1.02 –0.65  –0.48  37  26
 (–1.04)  (–0.67)  (–0.52)  (35)  (23)
Australia  –0.008 –0.005  –0.004  34  26
 (–0.008)  (–0.006)  (–0.004)  (31)  (22)
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. The value of 
SIGTOP for the rice industry was increased from 0.01 to 0.03. Figures in parentheses are results for the 
reference case. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or between regions. 
c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between 
industries in the same region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB. e Proportional difference 
between the first and second columns. f Proportional difference between the second and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations.     




Table D.8  GRP and GDP effects of increased SIGTOP (all industries) 
under different trade experimentsa 
 









Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra-regional trade 
only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only 
to allowing 
interregional trade f
 %  %  %  %  %
New South Wales        
Murrumbidgee –0.95  –0.52 –0.67  45  –28
 (–1.29)  (–0.66)  (–0.87)  (49)  (–32)
Murray –1.13  –0.70  –0.93  38  –33
 (–1.52)  (–0.90)  (–1.21)  (41)  (–35)
Victoria        
Mallee –0.88  –0.53  –0.32  39  40
 (–1.39)  (–0.71)  (–0.41)  (49)  (42)
Goulburn –0.69  –0.59  –0.30  14  49
 (–1.07)  (–0.90)  (–0.39)  (16)  (56)
–0.22 –0.18  –0.10  19  43 Loddon 
Campaspe  (–0.30) (–0.22)  (–0.13)  (25)  (42)
Ovens Murray  –0.13  –0.11  –0.04  19  60
 (–0.24)  (–0.19)  (–0.06)  (22)  (70)
South Australia        
Murray Lands  –0.91  –0.78  –0.24  14  70
 (–1.50)  (–1.18)  (–0.30)  (21)  (75)
Southern MDB  –0.71 –0.49  –0.40  31  18
 (–1.04)  (–0.67)  (–0.52)  (35)  (23)
Australia  –0.005 –0.004  –0.003  31  17
 (–0.008)  (–0.006)  (–0.004)  (31)  (22)
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. The value of 
SIGTOP was set at 0.10 for cattle industries and 0.05 for all other industries. Figures in parentheses are 
results for the reference case. b  No water trade permitted between industries within the same region or 
between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. d Trade 
permitted between industries in the same region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB. 
e Proportional difference between the first and second columns. f Proportional difference between the second 
and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations. 
     





Table D.9  GRP and GDP effects in the short run under different trade 
experimentsa 
 









Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra-regional trade 
only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only 
to allowing 
interregional trade f
 %  %  %  %  %
New South Wales        
Murrumbidgee –0.94  –0.62 –0.65  34  –5
 (–1.29)  (–0.66)  (–0.87)  (49)  (–32)
Murray –1.12  –0.80  –0.89  28  –11
 (–1.52)  (–0.90)  (–1.21)  (41)  (–35)
Victoria        
Mallee –0.96  –0.50  –0.44  48  10
 (–1.39)  (–0.71)  (–0.41)  (49)  (42)
Goulburn –0.72  –0.59  –0.43  18  28
 (–1.07)  (–0.90)  (–0.39)  (16)  (56)
–0.22 –0.16  –0.14  26  13 Loddon 
Campaspe  (–0.30) (–0.22)  (–0.13)  (25)  (42)
Ovens Murray  –0.16  –0.13  –0.07  21  47
 (–0.24)  (–0.19)  (–0.06)  (22)  (70)
South Australia        
Murray Lands  –0.97  –0.75  –0.30  22  60
 (–1.50)  (–1.18)  (–0.30)  (21)  (75)
Southern MDB  –0.73 –0.51  –0.44  30  13
 (–1.04)  (–0.67)  (–0.52)  (35)  (23)
Australia  –0.047 –0.031  –0.027  34  14
 (–0.008)  (–0.006)  (–0.004)  (31)  (22)
a GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. Figures in 
parentheses are results for the reference case. b No water trade permitted between industries within the same 
region or between regions. c Trade permitted between industries in the same region, but not between regions. 
d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as with other regions in the southern MDB. 
e Proportional difference between the first and second columns. f Proportional difference between the second 
and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations.     




Table D.10  GRP and GDP effects of a 20 per cent reduction in water 
availability under different trade experimentsa 
 









Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra-regional trade 
only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only 
to allowing 
interregional trade f
 %  %  %  %  %
New South Wales        
Murrumbidgee  –3.02 –1.45 –1.92 52 –32
Murray  –3.48 –1.98 –2.65 43 –34
Victoria         
Mallee  –3.67 –1.57 –0.98 57 38
Goulburn  –2.63 –2.09 –0.94 21 55
Loddon 
Campaspe  –0.70 –0.49 –0.31 30 36
Ovens Murray  –0.66 –0.46 –0.13 30 72
South Australia         
Murray Lands  –4.08 –2.89 –0.70 29 76
Southern MDB  –2.55 –1.53 –1.17 40 24
Australia  –0.027 –0.017 –0.012 36 30
a  GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. Water 
availability reduced by 20 per cent in all regions of the southern MDB. b No water trade permitted between 
industries within the same region or between regions. c  Trade permitted between industries in the same 
region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as with 
other regions in the southern MDB. e  Proportional difference between the first and second columns. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations. 
     





Table D.11  GRP and GDP effects of a 30 per cent reduction in water 
availability under different trade experimentsa 
   
 
 









Relative effects of 
moving from no 
trade to allowing 
intra-regional trade 
only e 
Relative effects of 
moving from intra-
regional trade only 
to allowing
interregional trade f
 %  %  %  %  %
New South Wales      
Murrumbidgee –5.11  –2.45 –3.23  52  –32
Murray –5.78  –3.30  –4.42  43  –34
Victoria        
Mallee –6.64  –2.59  –1.78  61  31
Goulburn –4.57  –3.54  –1.72  22  52
Loddon 
Campaspe –1.18  –0.78  –0.58  34  26
Ovens Murray  –1.26  –0.81  –0.24  36  71
South Australia      
Murray Lands  –7.48  –4.99  –1.27  33  75
Southern MDB  –4.43 –2.58  –2.02  42  22
Australia  –0.059 –0.036  –0.024  39  32
a  GRP and GDP include market sales of water. Purchases of water are treated as an input cost. Water 
availability reduced by 30 per cent in all regions of the southern MDB. b No water trade permitted between 
industries within the same region or between regions. c  Trade permitted between industries in the same 
region, but not between regions. d Trade permitted between industries in the same region as well as with 
other regions in the southern MDB. e  Proportional difference between the first and second columns. 
f Proportional difference between the second and third columns. 
Source: TERM-Water simulations.  
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